


For Enthusiasts of Pointe Du Hoc


POINTE DU HOC

Gamers Guide



RANGERS

Variants
Historical Notes
The BAR Gunner
Busting the Bocage
The Scenarios of PdH
BONUS Goodies!
...and more!




CRITICAL HIT

CH 9908



Our on-site research heroes Phil Nobo (left) and Alan Yates, at Pointe du Hoc.



The Pointe at low tide. It was a heck of a climb down for Phil Nobo to fetch 'your' special offer Normandy sand. We're glad he made it back up! 'L-Rod' Petty brought his two sons back to Pointe du Hoc when they were teens and the three Pettys climbed the infamous cliff again as a family.




The detailed diorama at the MUSÉE des RANGERS at Pointe du Hoc.




The German OP Bunker depicted on our game map in hex OO13. Note how the ground slopes down to the bunker and how little external damage resulted from the attack.



Le Manoir du St. Pierre, found in hex Q21/22 on our game map, as seen from hex P21 from along the hexspine.



At left, another view of the Manoir du St. Pierre as seen through the wall opening on hexside R26/S26 from hex R26.



CH Magazine (Issue #4, now out of print) in good company lying at the left hand side of the memorial (the right hand side is the French translation) which reads: "TO THE HEROIC RANGER COMMANDOES D2RN E2RN F2RN OF THE 116TH INF WHO UNDER THE COMMAND OF COLONEL JAMES E. RUDDER OF THE FIRST AMERICAN DIVISION ATTACKED AND TOOK POSSESSION OF THE POINTE DU HOC".

All photos by Phil Nobo.

POINTE DU HOC Gamers Guide

Table of Contents:

The Landing at Pointe du Hoc.....	4
Marines in the ETO.....	12
PdH Variants.....	14
The BAR Gunner in PdH.....	16
Errata and Clarifications.....	18
Scenario Tactics.....	19
Busting the Bocage.....	23



****IMPORTANT ERRATA: In the scenario FLIGHT OF THE PHOENIX (included in some PdHGG sets) the 2nd Panzer Brigade enters on the west edge of board 17.***

****FUN TIP: Number your LCAs on the Pointe du Hoc Play Aid like those listed in the article on page 4 and write your own 'account' of the landing.***

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The Landing at Pointe du Hoc

An excerpt from *Small Unit Actions*, War Department, Washington, D.C.
CMH Pub 100-14



Here we provide the historical context for our game, Pointe du Hoc with side-bars from veterans of the battle.

The Landing

D-Day weather was unfavorable for a landing assault, with rough seas that imperiled small landing craft during their approach to the beaches. Early visibility along the coast was poor, and an eastward-setting tidal current helped to produce errors in navigation. The results, on the Omaha Beach sectors, were delays in reaching shore and enough mislanding of assault craft to interfere seriously with the early schedule for the attack. The Ranger force did not escape these difficulties.

Shortly after leaving their transports (the LSI's Ben Machree and Amsterdam), the craft began to suffer the results of the heavy going.[^] Eight miles from shore LCA 860, carrying Capt. Harold K. Slater and 20 men of Company D, swamped in the 4-foot choppy waves. The personnel were picked up by rescue craft and carried to England, eventually to rejoin their unit on D+19. Ten minutes later one of the supply craft sank, with only one survivor. The other supply craft was soon in trouble and had to jettison all the packs of Companies D and E in order to stay afloat. The other craft survived, with varying degrees of trouble; several shipped so much water that the men had to bail with their helmets to help the pumps. From the start, all the Rangers were soaked with spray. In one respect they en-

joyed exceptional luck: there were very few cases of seasickness, in contrast to the general record at Omaha. Despite being wet, cold, and cramped by the three-hour trip, personnel of the three Ranger companies reached the shore in good shape for immediate and strenuous action. The most serious effect of the wetting was to soak the climbing ropes and rope ladders, making them heavier.

The leading group of nine surviving LCA's kept good formation, in a double column ready to fan out as they neared shore. Unfortunately, the guide craft lost its bearings as the coast line came in sight, and headed straight for Pointe de la Percee, three miles east of the target. When Colonel Rudder, in the lead LCA, realized the error he intervened and turned the column westward. But the damage had been done. The mistake cost more than 30 minutes in reaching Pointe du Hoc; instead on landing at H Hour, the first Ranger craft touched down about H+38, a delay that determined the whole course of action at the Point for the next two days. The main Ranger flotilla, eight companies strong, was following in from the transports, watching anxiously for the signal of success at Pointe du Hoc (two successive flares shot by 60mm mortars). By 0700, if no message or signal had come, Colonel Schneider's force was scheduled to adopt the alternate plan of action and land at the Vierville beach. They waited ten minutes beyond the time limit and then received by radio the code word TILT, prearranged signal to follow the alternative

plan. So Colonel Schneider turned in toward Vierville, where the 5th Rangers and A and B of the 2nd landed at 0745. Pending the outcome at Omaha Beach, and the success of Colonel Schneider's force in fighting cross country to the Point, Colonel Rudder's three companies would fight alone.

The error in direction had further consequences. The correction headed Colonel Rudder's column of LCA's back toward Pointe du Hoc, but now on a westerly course, roughly paralleling the cliffs and only a few hundred yards offshore. The flotilla thus had to run the gauntlet of fire from German strongpoints along three miles of coast. Fortunately these were few, and their fire was wild and intermittent. The only serious casualty was a DUKW, hit by 20mm fire as it neared the target area. Five of the nine men aboard were killed or wounded.

The plan for Landings had to be changed as a result of the misdirected approach. Since the column of LCA's was now coming at the Point from east instead of north, Company D's craft would not be able to swing out of column and reach the west side of the promontory in time to assault with the other units. Therefore, to effect synchronized attack, the nine assault craft deployed and came in on line together at the east side.

A final result of the delay was apparent as they reached the goal. Naval fire had halted just before H Hour, and the enemy on Pointe du Hoc had 40 minutes to recover from the effects of the bombardment. As the LCA's neared the Point, they received

scattered small-arms and automatic fire, and enemy troops were observed moving near the edge of the cliff. There was, however, no indication of artillery in action from the enemy positions.

At 0710, as the first craft were grounding under the cliffs, radio silence was broken to send Colonel Schneider the order for landing at Vierville. The message was acknowledged.

The small assault force was not entirely alone as it came in to a hostile shore. The British destroyer Talybont, which had taken part in the early bombardment of Pointe du Hoc at range of 2.7 miles, saw the flotilla heading in on wrong course, and found it difficult to understand, "as Texas' fall or shot on Pointe du Hoc was obvious." As the Rangers corrected course and Came under fire from the cliff positions, the Talybont closed range and for 15 minutes (0645-0700) raked enemy firing positions with 4-inch and 2-pounder shells. Meantime, the U.S. destroyer Satterlee, 2,500 yards from Pointe du Hoc, could see enemy troops assembling on the cliff, and opened with main battery and machine-gun fire.

The Cliff Assault

The nine LCA's touched down on a front of about 500 yards, the right-

hand craft just under the tip of Pointe du Hoc, and the others spaced fairly evenly. No great distance separated some of the boat teams, but according to plan they went into action as separate units, each facing its particular problems of escalade and opposition.


In certain general respects, their problems were similar. The 30 yard strip of beach between water and cliff had been completely cratered by bombs. The craters were to handicap the unloading of men and supplies and were to render the DUKWs useless after landing, for these craft were nowhere able to cross the sand and get close enough to the cliff to reach it with their extension ladders. The cliff face showed extensive marks of the naval and air bombardment; huge chunks of the top had been torn out, forming talus mounds at the base. A few grenades were thrown down or rolled over the edge as the first Rangers crossed the sand, and enemy small-arms fire came from scattered points along the cliff edge. Particularly dangerous was enfilade fire, including automatic weapons, from the German position on the left flank of the beach. Once at the foot of the cliff the Rangers were better off, for the piles of debris gave partial defilade from the flanking fires, and the enemy directly above would have to expose them-

Herm Stein's D-Day...

A tremendous barrage started and we got a constant swoosh overhead. After it stopped, we soon spotted land. To our amazement and wonderment, we made a 90° turn and paralleled shore. Instead of being on the left flank, we were now last on a long line of small boats. We dropped the puke bags and looked alive when the eater began to spit up with small arms fire. We later found out that was the Sector Company had to take. On we went endlessly, so it seemed, past 7:00 then 7:30, was past our touch down time. Well, if we were perplexed, I can imagine what was going through Masney's and Wintz's heads, our two Officers aboard. Then we saw the rockets going off with the ropes trailing a graceful arc. My heart sank for everyone I saw, fell short. Holy cripes, what are we going to be, stuck here! It was Wintz who pulled his pistol and calmly told the English sailor in charge "you drop those gates or let those charges go before I give the order and I'll blow your head off."

On we went and it seemed we were going to ride right up the cliff in our little boat go! And off the rockets went. What a beautiful sight, five out of six went right over the top. Wintz wasn't very demonstrative, but I saw his cool pay off a few times. And then there was Masney running up and down the beach.. It seemed like he was the master in a three ring circus urging his charges to perform their rope acts. We couldn't move fast enough to satisfy his anxious prodding. About half way up, I was being pushed out, kept struggling on and finally realized my Mae West had blown up. I pushed the release and sighed with relief to get rid of that! Ray Cole was over by then, followed by Youso and myself, Youso hollered back "Cole's been hit, hit the dirt". A few darting movements forward

continued on page 6, left column



Stein, continued...

and sure enough Cole lay immobile. His remains lay in the National Cemetery near Omaha Beach. A surprisingly few didn't make it to the top, since our ropes landed in a protected cranny of the cliff. I waited for Richards since he was the B A R man and I was the assistant, carrying 200 extra rounds of ammunition. The steady bursts slowed into an occasional harassing fire, most likely the enemy decided to withdraw to a more favorable spot. Being the farthest on the left flank, Wintz has us form a defense line going up the left side and gradually curving to the right. In our juggling around, it wasn't long before we started to pick up fire from them again, but further out. We exchanged fire and picked up sight of machine guns bursts coming from an opening in the hedge row some one hundred yards out. Wintz decided to get that information back to a bunker on the cliffs edge where the CP had been established. After all, we had artillery support right at hand. A US Destroyer, Satterlee, has moved close by the gate. The next shell tore dead center into the target. That's a lot better, than assaulting it, we thought with some relief. With our left flank quiet, Jack decided to move out another one hundred yards and so we turned our attention towards the black top road. We moved cautiously with a few fellows of the first platoon. We still hadn't gotten out of the area of the massive shell craters caused by the bombers and sixteen inch guns, so we perched ourselves at the top of one of the excavations. Jack was scanning the horizon with his field glasses gradually getting higher off the edge. It had been quiet for some time now and we weren't much concerned with enemy fire. "Hey, Herman, take a look, those are our guys way out there!" Sure enough slightly to the right, a good three

continued on page 8, left column

selves in order to place observed fire or to aim their grenades.

Naval support came to the aid of the Rangers at this critical moment. The destroyer Satterlee watched the craft reach shore, and saw the enemy firing from the cliff above.

The Satterlee immediately took the cliff tops under fire from its 5-inch guns and 40-mm machine-guns. Fire control was excellent, despite attempts of enemy machine guns and a heavier gun to counter the destroyer's effort. Comdr. J. W. Marshall, commanding the Satterlee, believed this fire was decisive in enabling the Rangers to get up the cliff. However, his impression that the assault force "was pinned under the cliff and being rapidly cut to pieces under enemy fire" is not confirmed by the speed with which the escalate go under way, or by other details of the landing. Curiously enough, only three or four men out of 120 survivors interviewed remembered noticing naval fire after touchdown. One of these was Colonel Rudder, who "had the living hell scared out of him" by explosions which brought down a section of cliff just over his head, and which came from an unknown source. Both impressions—the Rangers', that there was no fire support worth mentioning, and the Satterlee's, that the Rangers were pinned down—are easily understandable under the circumstances of battle and the difficulties of observation. The probability is that the destroyer's fire on the cliff top, at the moment when the Rangers were starting their assault, did a great deal to prevent effective enemy opposition at the decisive moment.

In any event, the assault went forward without check. Ranger casualties on the beach totaled about 15, most of them from the raking fire to their left. In something less than ten minutes from landing, the first Ranger parties were getting over the cratered edges of the cliff top. The story of the boat teams will be given in order from right to left, roughly the order of landing.

LCA 861. Carrying a boat team of Company E, commanded by 1st Lt. Theodore E. Lapres, Jr., this craft

grounded about 25 yards from the bottom of the cliff. Three or four Germans were standing on the cliff edge, shooting down at the craft. Rangers near the stern took these enemy under fire and drove them, out of sight. At the instant of touchdown the rear pair of rockets was fired, then the other two pairs in succession. All the ropes fell short of the cliff edge, as a result of being thoroughly soaked. In some cases not more than half the length of rope or ladder was lifted from the containing box.

As the Rangers crossed the strip of cratered sand, grenades were thrown down from above them, or rolled over the cliff edge. Those were of the "potato-masher" type, with heavy concussion effects but small fragmentation. They caused two casualties. The hand-rockets were carried ashore, and the first one was fired at 15 yards from the cliff. It went over the top and caught. Pfc. Harry W. Roberts started up the hand-line, bracing his feet against the 80-degree slope. He made about 25 feet; the rope slipped or was cut, and Roberts slithered down. The second rocket was fired and the grapnel caught. Roberts went up again, made the top (he estimated his climbing time at 40 seconds), and pulled into a small cratered niche just under the edge. As he arrived, the rope was cut. Roberts tied it to a picket. This pulled out under the weight of the next man, and the rope fell off the cliff, marooning Roberts. However, a 20-foot mound of clay knocked off the cliff enabled Roberts' team to get far enough up the side to throw him the rope. This time he lay across it, and five men, including Lieutenant Lapres, came up. Roberts had not yet seen an enemy and had not been under fire. Without waiting for further arrivals, the six Rangers started for their objective, the heavily constructed OP north tip of the fortified area. About ten minutes had elapsed since touchdown.

Just after Lapres' group got up, heavy explosion occurred above the rest of 861's team, waiting their turn on the rope. Pfc. Paul L. Medeiros was half buried under debris from the cliff. None of the men knew what caused

the explosion, whether a naval shell, or the detonation of a German mine of a peculiar type found later at one or two places along the cliff edge. The enemy had hung naval shells (200-mm or larger) over the edge, attached by wire to a pull-type firing device and fitted with a short delay time fuze.^b The explosion had no effect on the escalade. Medeiros and four more Rangers came up quickly, found Roberts' party already gone and out of sight, and followed from the cliff edge toward the same objective.^c

LCA 862. This craft, carrying 15 Rangers and NSFC personnel, landed about 100 yards left of the flank LCA. The men had no trouble in disembarking, but once on the sand they found themselves exposed to machine-gun fire from eastward of the landing area. One man was killed and one wounded by this fire; two more injured by grenade fragments.

The forward pair of rockets had been fired immediately on touchdown, followed by all four others together. One plain and two toggle ropes reached the top, but one toggle pulled out. Tech. 5 Victor J. Aguzzi, 1st Lt. Joseph E. Luegans (commanding the team), and S/Sgt. Joseph J. Cleaves went up the two remaining ropes, arrived at the top almost together, and fell onto a convenient shell hole just beyond the edge. There they paused only long enough for two more men to join; then, following standard Ranger tactics, the five moved off without waiting for the rest of the team, who came up a few minutes later.

LCA 888. Colonel Rudder's craft, first to hit the beach, had 15 men of Company E and 6 headquarters personnel, including Lt. J. W. Eikner, communications officer. A few enemy troops were seen on the cliff edge as the LCA neared shore, but, when Sgt. Dominick B. Boggetto shot one German off the edge with a BAR, the others disappeared. The Rangers had trouble in getting through the beach craters; neck deep in water, they found it hard to climb out because of the slick clay bottom. A few grenades came over the cliff without causing casualties.

The rockets were fired in series, at 35 yards from the cliff base. None of the waterlogged ropes reached the top. When two Rangers, best of the group at free-climbing, tried to work up the smashed cliff face without ropes, they were balked by the slippery clay surface, which gave way too easily to permit knife-holds. Bombs or shells had brought down a mass of wet clay from the cliff top, forming a mound of 35 to 40 feet high against the cliff. A 16-foot section of the extension ladder, with a toggle rope attached, was carried to the top of the mound and set up. A Ranger climbed the ladder, cut a foothold in the cliff, and stood in this to hold the ladder while a second man climbed it for 16 feet. The top man repeated the process, and this time Tech. 5 George J. Putzek reached the edge. Lying flat, with the ladder in his arms, he held on while a man below climbed the toggle rope, then the ladder.

From there on it was easy. As the first men up moved a few yards from the cliff edge to protect the climbers, they found plenty of cover in bomb craters, and no sign of an enemy. In 15 minutes from landing, all the Company E men from LCA 888 were up and ready to move on. Colonel Rudder and headquarters personnel remained for the moment below, finding shelter from enfilade fire in a shallow cave at the bottom of the cliff. By 0725, 1st Lt. James W. Eikner had his equipment set up and flashed word by SCR 300 that Colonel Rudder's force had landed. Five minutes later he sent out the code word indicating "men up the cliff"; the "Roger" that receipted for this message, again on SCR 300, was Eikner's last communication of D Day on the Ranger command net. When he sent the message PRAISE THE LORD ("all men up cliff") at 0745, no response was forthcoming.

LCA 722. Twenty yards left of Colonel Rudder's craft, LCA 722 hit shore with 15 Company E Rangers, 5 headquarters men, a Stars and Stripes photographer, and a Commando officer who had assisted the Rangers in training. Touchdown was made at the edge of a crater, and the men could not avoid it in debarking. Enemy gre-

L-Rod Petty lands...

As the assault craft neared the French shores it became apparent to the lead boat that a major error was taking place. The group was not headed toward the Point, but was nearing a landing on Pointe de la Pierre, four miles west of Pointe du Hoc. An adjustment was made, but it caused the craft to come under fire from the enemy all the way to our true destination.

Years later I would hear many Rangers state knowingly that they knew the LCAs were headed in the wrong direction and were relieved when Colonel Rudder corrected the error. Not L-Rod (the author's nickname), and I was standing on the bow the entire trip. I thought that it was a planned maneuver to make the approach running along the cliffs and that it was a good tactic. I did not know the exact location of Pointe du Hoc nor did I believe anyone did except the lead boat. The craft that carried our group received scattered fire from the cliff tops as it made the parallel run, but the aim was not accurate and of little concern. I was further convinced that it was a clever maneuver when all craft swung wide seaward then swung back to approach the cliffs in a straight line.

There she was! Pointe du Hoc—bigger than life and the object of months of training in cliff climbing. For some crazy reason I felt exhilarated and for the first time was eager to get on with the mission. Crouched and ready we waited. I pulled McHugh's ear over to my mouth, "Watch out for Garney. I've got to get up quick with this B.A.R. for fire-power." Mac gave a short nod then grinned. "You know how to handle that awkward thing?" As we began to laugh the boat hit ground and the ramp dropped. We charged out before it was completely down and dropped into deep water. The boat had grounded on the seaward side of a large bomb crater.

I had filled all of my pockets and the inside of my fatigues shirt with extra B.A.R. magazines. That, with my already fully packed ammunition belt was too much weight and I sank. It was a tough struggle to crawl up to

continued on page 8, right column

Stein, continued...

to four hundreds yards out, they sure looked like GI helmets moving about. Jack took back the glasses and was looking once again to confirm that they were our guys.

I slipped down saying "Hey, Jack, get down, there might be a sniper around." I heard a soft thud and Jack fell forward over the edge of the crater. I immediately grabbed his ankles and pulled him down by his muscular legs. He was a short power house of a man, played college football and respected by all. I admired and looked up to Jack as much as anyone in the outfit. In fact, before embarking he was told he didn't have to come due to his high blood pressure. In training, Jack would never have made a mistake and stayed so long under observation. There was a flap of skin upon one side of his neck where the blood was just gushing out with every pump. I automatically sealed back the opening not realizing till later that was where the bullet had come out and not in. The thick red liquid leaked out relentlessly and for three weeks I carried Jack's blood on the lower arms of my winter undershirt. About this time Bombardier came over to see what was going on, Jack's eyes open glassily and I knew he was gone.

"Hey Bomber, I got to take the gun, did you run into anybody from the second section" "Yeah I just passed Cloise" Bomber explained. Cloise being of average height and slight build, didn't seem the most likely candidate to carry an extra ten clips of BAR ammo, but I spent many a comforting night cuddled up to him in a fox hole. Cloise was literally my right hand man. We hol'ed together until Anoy observed his great potential and weasled him away from me. I really didn't mind though, for they were a great team. Whenever there was a tough assignment or I had my fill of patrol

continued on page 10, left column

nades were in- effectual, and the craters and debris on the beach gave sufficient cover from enfilading fire from the left. The only casualty was Pfc. John J. Siliman, wounded three times as the craft came in, hit twice on the beach, and destined to survive. A good deal of assorted equipment came on this craft, including the SCR 284, two pigeons, a 60-mm mortar with ammunition, and some demolitions. All were got ashore without loss, though it took maneuvering to avoid the deep water in the crater. Tech. 4 C. S. Parker and two other communications men hefted the big radio set on a pack board, and managed to get it in and working before the first climbers from 722 reached the top.

The rockets had been fired just before landing. One ladder and one plain rope got up and held (LCA 722 had experienced no trouble with water, and the ropes were comparatively dry). The single rope lay in a slight crevice, but the ladder came down on an overhang where it seemed exposed to the flanking fire and would be hard to climb. Tech. 5 Edward P. Smith tried the plain rope and found he could easily "walk it up." On top three or four minutes after landing, he saw a group of Germans to his right throwing grenades over the cliff. Sgt. Hayward A. Robey joined Smith with a BAR. Robey lay in a shallow niche at the cliff edge and sprayed the grenadiers with 40 or 50 rounds, fast fire. Three of the enemy dropped and the rest disappeared into shelters. Pfc. Frank H. Peterson, lightly wounded on the beach by a grenade, joined up and the three Rangers went off on their mission without waiting for the next climbers.

The mortar section in this boat team remained below, according to plan, with the purpose of setting up their 60-mm on the beach to deliver supporting fires. But the beach was too exposed to make this practicable, and time was consumed in getting ammunition from the one surviving supply craft. About 0745 the mortar team went on top without having yet fired.

LCA 668. Company D's craft had been scheduled to land on the west side of the Point. As a result of the

change in angle of approach, the two surviving LCA's came in to the left of Company E, and in the center of the Ranger line.

LCA 668 grounded short of the beach strip, as a result of boulders knocked from the cliff by bombardment. The men had to swim in about 20 feet. While 1st Sgt. Leonard G. Lomell was bringing in a box of rope and a hand-projector rocket, he was wounded in the side by a machine-gun bullet but reached shore and kept going. Despite the unusual distance from the cliff, and the very wet ropes, three rockets had carried the cliff edge with a toggle rope and the two rope ladders. However, the grapnels on the ladders just made the top; since the lead rope connecting grapnels with the top of the ladders was 40 feet long, the Rangers had, in effect, two plain ropes and a toggle. Sergeant Lomell put his best climber on the toggle while he tried one of the ladders. All ropes were on an overhang, and only the toggle line proved practicable. Even on it, climbing would be slow, so Lomell called for the extension ladders. Picking a spot high on the talus, his men found that one 16-foot section added to a 20-foot section reached the top of the vertical stretch, beyond which a slide of debris had reduced the slope enough to make it negotiable without ropes. Two men had got up by the toggle rope; the rest used the ladder and made the top quickly. Grenades caused some annoyance until the first men up could cover the rest of the party. Twelve men moved off from the edge with Sergeant Lomell and 1st Lt. George F. Kerchner.

LCA 858. Shipping enough water all the way in to keep the Rangers busy, this craft nevertheless kept up fairly well and was only a minute or two behind the others at the beach. The men were put out into a crater and went over their heads in muddy water. Despite the wetting, a bazooka was the only piece of equipment put out of action. Three men were hit by machine-gun fire from the east flank.

The rockets were fired in series, the plain ropes first. All the ropes were wet, and only one hand-line got over the cliff. It lay in a crevice that would

give some protection from enemy flanking fire, but the direct approach to the foot of the rope was exposed. The Company D Rangers worked their way to the rope through the piles of debris at the cliff base. While one man helped the wounded get to Colonel Rudder's CP, where the medics had set up, all the party went up this one rope and found it not too hard going. They could get footholds in the cliff face, and a big crater reduced the steepness of the climb near the top. The group was up within 15 minutes. As in most other cases, the first few men on top had moved off together, and the boat team did not operate as a unit after the escalade.

LCA 887. As a result of Company D's unscheduled landing in the center of the line of craft, the three LCA's carrying Company F were crowded eastward, all of them touching down beyond the area originally assigned them. Few of the Rangers realized this at the time.

LCA 887 had not been much bothered by either water or enemy action on the trip in. The craft grounded five yards out from dry beach, and the shorter men got a ducking in the inevitable crater. No equipment trouble resulted; even Sgt. William L. Petty's BAR, wet here and muddied later when he slipped on the cliff, fired perfectly when first needed. Some enemy fire, including automatic weapons, came from either flank. Two Rangers were wounded.

Just before hitting the beach the two forward rockets were fired. Only one of the plain lines carried, and 1st Lt. Robert C. Arman, commanding the team, figured the heavier ropes had no chance. So, all four of the mounted rockets, together with the boxes carrying toggle ropes and ladders, were taken out on the sand—a matter of ten minutes' heavy work, while the coxswain of the LCA did a notable job of holding the craft in at the beach edge. When the rockets were set up for firing, the lead wire for making the firing connection was missing. Tech/Sgt. John I. Cripps fired all four in turn by touching the short connection, three feet from the rocket base, with his "hot-box." Each time, the flashback

blinded Cripps and blew sand and mud all over him. The other Rangers saw him clean his eyes, shake his head, and go after the next rocket: "he was the hell-of-a-looking mess." But all the ropes went up, and made it possible for the party to make the top. Sergeant Petty and some other expert climbers had already tried the plain rope and failed; it was on a straight fall, requiring hand-over-hand work with no footholds possible, and the men had trouble with their muddy hands and clothes on the wet rope.

Sergeant Petty started up one of the ladders, got 30 feet up, and then slid all the way back on the cliff face when the grapnel pulled out. Tech. 5 Carl Wunsch was going up the other ladder when fire from somewhere on the flanks began to chip the cliff all around him. Petty went up after Wunsch, and found him, unwounded, in a shell hole at the top. Here Petty waited for two more Rangers and then they set out for their objective.

LCA 884. This craft, the target for considerable enemy fire from cliff positions on the way to the Point, had replied with its Lewis guns and the BAR's of the Rangers. Touchdown was made on the edge of a shell hole, in water shoulder-high. Three Rangers were hit by fire coming from the left flank. When rockets were fired in series, front to rear, four got over the cliff, but every rope lay in such position as to be fully exposed to the continuing enemy small-arms fire. Moreover, the Rangers were so muddied in getting through the craters on the beach that the plain ropes would have been unusable after the first climber went up. The only rope ladder that reached the top was caught below on beach boulders and hung at an awkward angle. Several men tried the other ropes without success, and Pvt. William E. Anderson got only part way up in his attempt at free-climbing. 1st Lt. Jacob J. Hill finally took the group over to the left, where they used the ladders of 883's boat team.

LCA 883. Last in the column of approach, this craft was last to reach shore, nearly 300 yards left of its planned position and considerably beyond the edge of the main fortified

Petty, continued...

the landward side of the crater to a point where my head was out of the water, but I made it and scurried for the base of the cliffs with light automatic fire kicking up the sand around me. I heard a rope *whoosh* over my head but when I arrived at the base of the cliff it was sliding down the face. I ran to a straight rope, tested it and began climbing. It was wet and a bit slippery but after sliding down that first rope, I grabbed a rope ladder and was on top in short order.

The devastation was complete. Huge bomb craters, great slabs of concrete, remains of metal structures, but no guns. McHugh and Garney were the only two in the immediate area and they were as intrigued as me. At a distance to the right I could see Dog and Easy companies in a skirmish near the fortifications at the point. No fire was coming Fox company's way where I was. I looked down at the beach to find the reason no one else from boat 887 had come up and try to locate the platoon leader or the platoon sergeant. To my great astonishment the latter had somehow moved the rope launching apparatus on shore and with apparent calm was rocketing ropes over the cliffs. This, with automatic fire kicking up sand all around him.

Sergeant Cripp's bravery had quick results as men from boat 887 began appearing topside in numbers and had the same reaction to the havoc as those before them. Waiting for the arrival of the Lieutenant they milled around in a confused group. Although not the ranking noncom I spread them out. Still no officer arrived on the scene. Questions of, 'what do we do next, L-Rod?' kept being asked. I wanted no part of getting involved in this larger group—that was the Lieutenant's job. Finally, and in irritation, I said, "I don't know what you guys are going to do—you ought to wait for the Platoon Leader—but my squad is heading for the blacktop road. That's where we're all supposed to end up." My men automatically assumed the assault formation that had worked well for us in training. L-Rod out front. Coldsmith, Colden and Bouchard in the center keeping pace with the flanks. We advanced from bomb crater to crater, giving each other cover. McHugh trotted up near me, "Atta boy, L-Rod, we'll do better by ourselves."

Stein, continued...

work they were always there. Cloise willingly became my assistant Afid soon after we squared away, we started to get bombarded with mortars and artillery. They had us zeroed in so it was a mad scramble out of there. With those shells landing to our left, we automatically went to the right. After being forced over five or six craters, we were almost in line with the battalion CP. Pretty well winded, we were sure relieved when they stopped. But now, there was a new sound, small arms fire to the right of where Richards had spotted the GI's. What the heck are they shooting at? Darned if we could figure it out. The firing came even closer. We finally realized they were firing on the dormant CP. Their present path would bring them very close to our flank. There were two squads of six or seven men each, and one machine gun squad. We decided to blast the automatic weapon when it got opposite US. Away went the BAR along with Cloise rapidly firing his M-1. The bullets found their mark for our blasts had quieted the action. We still had the other squad to contend with, so I loaded a grenade on a grenade launcher on to Cloise's rifle. He fired and nothing happened. "Cripes, I forgot to pull the pin." We got another off, that fell short. From the opposite side of the crater a familiar voice called out "what's all the noise about? We've got a couple of squads pinned down out there!" We softly called back. Give me the range, Stinnette said gruffly. "Gee whiz, they are only sixty or seventy feet out" I said, thinking no mortar could be geared that close. The sinewy tough ex-merchant marine quickly estimated his distance to the Section Leader, Elder, the master of short range work. Elder had his 1st shell winging through the air. Instant reaction, eight or nine Germans took to their heels with Cloise and I popping at

continued on right column

area on Pointe du Hoc. Just to their left, a jut in the cliff protected the boat team from the flanking fire that caused so much trouble for the other landing parties. They made a dry landing, and had a perfect score with the six rockets. This gave an opportunity to use the climbing assignments on a full schedule, using every rope. Nevertheless the going was hard, even on the ladders. 1st Lt. Richard A. Wintz, on a plain rope, found it impossible to get any footholds on the slippery cliff. The wet and muddy rope made it difficult for hand-over-hand pulling, and at the top Wintz was "never so tired in his life." He found six men together and started them out immediately.

Summary. The first great difficulty, landing and getting up the cliff, had been surmounted., Enemy resistance, despite the delayed landing, had been weak and ineffective except for the enfilade fire from the machine-gun position just east of Pointe du Hoc. The equipment and training for escalade had met the test. On only two craft had the mounted rockets failed to get at least one rope over the cliff top. The hand-projectors and extension ladders had been useful as supplementary equipment where the ropes failed, and only one boat team found it necessary to use the ropes of another party. The three dukws, stopped at the water's edge by craters, could not bring their mechanically operated extension ladders into play. One of them made the trial, only to have the ladder rest on the cliff side at a considerable angle, short of the top and unbalanced by the motion of the surf.

The assault met unforeseen circumstances, but their effects were not always to the disadvantage of the enterprise. Craters in the beach had made the landings slower and wetter than expected, had neutralized the dukws, and had impeded unloading of ammunition and supplies; on the other hand, they gave some cover from enemy fire. Damage done to the cliff face by bombardment seems, on the whole, to have helped the escalade work, for the piles of debris not only gave cover from the enfilade fire but reduced the height of the climb, particularly for use of extension ladders. The top of

the cliff was much cut back by craters, further reducing the areas of sheer slope and providing cover for the first arrivals at the top.

The climbing parties had gone ahead with speed, determination, and resourcefulness, ready to improvise when necessary. This was the main reason for their success, and for the fact that within 30 minutes from touchdown all the attacking force was on top except for casualties, headquarters personnel, and some mortar men (30 to 40 Rangers out of about 190).

Stein, continued...

them like ducks in a shooting gallery. The Browning automatic also became an extension of myself for the next eleven months.

The scenario was played many more times before we caught sight of one lone German going out of sight. That extra muscle that Elder applied brought gleeful relief

Stein, continued...

to Cloise and myself. The remaining couple of hours passed uneventfully for us and in the late afternoon Masny established F Company as a perimeter in the front and left side of the Command Post. What was over for us was far from over for the second Platoon and a few of the first of F Company.


There's no doubt that D-Day was Petty's finest hour. Without the help of McHugh, Goldsmith, Golden, Dix, Alexander and others, Petty wouldn't have made it but his exploits dazzle the imagination. He should have been dead five times over. His charmed life eased us through many a precarious situation.

Footnotes:

A. The LCA's had been designed with shallow draft and for relatively slow speeds; under D-Day conditions they proved less seaworthy than the LCVP's, although their draft permitted them to make a drier landing.

B. If, as French civilians later reported, many such shells had been hung, they were probably neutralized by naval fire. No other Ranger party saw them. They may have been planned for dropping to the beach rather than for explosion at the cliff edge.

C. The photograph on page 13, taken a year later, shows the cliff at the point where 861's men climbed. Two ropes, one of them a ladder type, are still in place. This suggests that later climbers brought up a rope ladder to supplement the first rope, but the point cannot be settled by available evidence.



The map above shows the situation depicted in the PdH scenario "The Longest Night". The reinforcements arriving on turns one and three represent the "Axis of 1st and 2d attack" and the turn five reinforcements represent the "Axis of 3d attack". During the interview process 'L-Rod' Petty disputed where some of the front line, named soldiers were and made other disputes of the official history. We do not feel it is our place to name names here and will defer to the eventual publication of his memoirs. Suffice it to say the exact location of one particular man during the heat of battle, at night no less, is easily imagined as subject to dispute. Note the preponderance of "BAR Positions" marked on the map above. A total of eight are shown, including BAR Gunner Petty.

Marines in the ETO

...and a near-landing at Pointe du Hoc on D-Day

by Dr. Abraham J. Edelheit



Introduction:

The ASL® Rulebook (ASLRB) is the bible of our hobby; it's rules set out the proper way for us to enjoy re-playing history in the comfort of our own homes, while matching wits with an opponent (human or—for those of us who play solitaire—a game system) and with the leaders and troops who fought the battles more than fifty years ago. On the surface, I would probably strike the average ASL® player as a "Rule Book Junkie," that is as a person who unequivocally follows the rulebook on every issue—that certainly would be the first impression gleaned from the two reviews I've published in *Critical Hit* and from my aversion to sleaze plays that have no basis in World War II military doctrine.

However, I also happen to be a person who likes to test the application of rules by investigating those exceptions that break the bounds of convention: in doing so, I believe we "find the edge of the envelope" (to coin a phrase) and thereby prove the rules' validity. This is nowhere more important than in the sections of the ASLRB that deal with national characteristics and/or which limit the use of certain types of units under certain circumstances. I am particularly referring to ASLRB, section G17.15.

The rule is unequivocal: "U.S.M.C. Personnel may appear only in scenarios vs the Japanese..." (the rule section then sets out chronological limitations on U.S.M.C. MMC that have no bearing here). In other words, the rule is to be construed as unequivocally banning the use of Marines or

Marine MMC in any European Theatre of Operations (ETO) scenarios, without exception. The problem with this rule is that the historical context was not so simple, because many Marines served in, or on the peripheries of, the ETO. They did so both as individuals (which would have no bearing on ASL®) and in smaller or larger units deployed with the fleet during operations in the Atlantic Ocean and the ETO (broadly defined).

Historical Background:

The first such deployment occurred even before U.S. entry into the war: the First Marine Brigade was deployed to Iceland on 22 June, 1941, remaining there—under U.S. Army command—until March 1942. To be sure, these Marines saw no combat service while in Iceland. They were here to relieve the British garrison that had occupied the island since 1940 to prevent an anticipated German invasion that never happened. Still, the Marines were there; and if the Germans had indeed landed on Iceland, the possibilities would have been most interesting.

Of far greater importance from our perspective was the fact that the U.S.M.C. also provided (and I believe, still provides) small detachments on board major warships of the U.S. Navy. During World War II, Marine ship detachments served aboard Battleships, Cruisers, and Aircraft Carriers, theoretically bearing the following table of organization:

Battleship: two or three officers and one hundred other ranks.

Heavy Cruiser/Aircraft Carrier: one

or two officers and eighty other ranks.

Light Cruiser: one officer and forty-five other ranks.

Smaller detachments might serve on a Destroyer, but only if that ship served in a command capacity. Marines serving aboard naval vessels were normally assigned gunnery positions, but they might form a landing party if such were needed. Deployments of U.S. Navy ships in the Atlantic and/or ETO meant that a minimum of 3,793 Marines served there, representing a fairly respectable force in case of any emergencies. Then too, it should be noted—at least in passing—that a small Marine detachment existed in London (as part of the U.S. Embassy). Once again, the potential for use of Marines as ground troops in the ETO thus existed.

There were plans for such use, although not as many as might be expected. For example, an unknown number of Marines were supposed to participate in the Dieppe raid. They would have landed in concert with the Royal Marine Commandos, but their participation—unlike the small number of U.S. Army Rangers who did land—was cancelled when the raid was postponed from its original target date of 3 July 1942. Individual Marines did participate in a number of raids after graduating from British Commando school, however. And while their numbers were never significant, it is plausible that some Commando scenarios ought to include the occasional U.S.M.C. half-squad.

Operation Torch was the first time that Marines, organized into autonomous units, actually did see combat

service against a foe other than the Japanese. These may be divided into three groups: the first serving with the Western Task Force (Casablanca), the second with the Central Task Force (Arzew/Oran), and the third serving with the Eastern Task Force (Algiers). The Western Task Force, for instance, comprised over 100 vessels, including three battleships (including a Marine component of perhaps as many as nine officers and 300 other ranks), one Aircraft Carrier, two heavy cruisers, and four light cruisers (including as many as ten officers and 420 other ranks).

At Safi and Port Lyautey (Western Task Force) Marine shore parties were landed to seize airfields and hold them until relieved by Army ground units so that squadrons of P-40 fighters could be landed quickly to provide air support for other U.S. forces. Readers who remember G.I. scenario 35, "The French Decide to Fight" will be gratified to know that the Special Raider Detachment included in the U.S. order of battle was a Marine detachment from the Heavy Cruiser *USS Philadelphia*: anyone doing an update of that classic chestnut should take that into account (especially since those Marines would have to be represented by 4-6-8 squads in an updated version).

A similar picture emerges in the story of the Central Task Force. Detachments of Marines landed at both Arzew (also famous for being the first combat operation of Darby's Rangers as a complete unit) and at Oran. In both cases the units were tasked with seizing the ports, cutting boom lines to permit Allied vessels to enter, and securing French ships in the harbors to prevent any hostile actions, until the attitude of French forces to the Allied operation was clear. To be sure, not many Marines were deployed here: in all, two officers and twenty-four Marines landed at Arzew, while twelve Marines landed (with British units) at Oran. A similarly small party, about which no further details are known, landed at Algiers.

No Marines served ashore during operations in Sicily and Italy, at least not as far as is known by research to

date, but again, many U.S. Navy ships were deployed and could have landed parties in an emergency. This was almost the case on D-Day, and it provides the background to the events at Pointe du Hoc.

D-Day and Beyond:

On D-Day, the U.S. Navy deployed three Battleships and two Heavy Cruisers in support of the landings (twenty-one Destroyers also served, but as far as I can tell, none had a Marine detachment). That means that in potential, the Marines could have landed up to fifteen officers and 550 men. In reality, the numbers were much smaller, but still were fairly impressive. The Battleship *USS Texas*—which provided fire support for Omaha Beach—had a Marine detachment of one officer and eighty-three enlisted men. The Marine detachment aboard the *USS Texas* usually was responsible for manning four 40mm AA batteries. However, due to conditions at Pointe du Hoc, the men of the *USS Texas* Marine detachment were almost landed in support of the Rangers on D-Day.

As is well known, three companies of the 2nd Ranger Battalion landed at Pointe du Hoc mid-morning on June 6th. By early afternoon they had accomplished their immediate tasks (capturing or destroying the German short battery), but casualties were mounting. Due to an error in transmission the remaining companies of the 2nd Rangers and the entire 5th Ranger Battalion, which was originally supposed to land at the Pointe to reinforce Lieutenant Colonel James Rudder's Party, were diverted to Omaha Beach. This meant that the Rangers already ashore could receive no substantial reinforcements unless and until they linked up with forces breaking out of the Omaha beachhead. Late on June 6 or early on June 7, the Naval Shore Fire Control Party (SFCP) relayed a message from Rudder requesting the evacuation of wounded, resupply of ammunition, and the landing of reinforcements.

Under the circumstances, the only troops immediately available aboard the *USS Texas* were the eighty-four

men of the Marine detachment, most of whom had no previous combat experience. They were readied for a landing and two LCVPs drew up to the battleship to load them for the run in to shore. The original plan, such as it was, was to land the Marine detachment, help Rudder stabilize the situation ashore and then withdraw the Marines. This plan, it should be emphasized, was very rudimentary, since almost no one aboard the *USS Texas* had precise information on the conditions ashore. Indeed, one of the Marine NCOs reputedly remarked that: "This is going to be the biggest slaughter since Custer got his at Little Big Horn."

Still, duty called: the Marines were issued small arms and hand grenades. Just at that moment, the mission was called off: apparently, someone in the Army chain of command got wind of the plan and nixed it—apparently out of concern for the possibility that newspaper headlines might read, "Marines save Rangers at Normandy." Instead of Marines, the two LCVPs were loaded with ammunition and with a medical party from the *USS Texas*. After landing, the craft were used to evacuate wounded Rangers and to remove German prisoners of war. The Marines never landed on D-Day. It is interesting to speculate how the battle might have turned but had the eighty-four Marines landed on June 6 or June 7. Certainly, Rudder's position would have been more secure during the night of 6/7 June, when the Germans were able to counterattack and shatter the forward portions of the Ranger line. It is also worthwhile remembering that of 225 Rangers who landed at Pointe du Hoc on D-Day, only ninety (including walking wounded who refused evacuation) were still able to bear arms when relieved on D+2—an astounding 60% casualty rate—and any help clearly would have been beneficial.

The D-Day landings were not the end of Marine participation in the ETO. A party of ninety U.S. Marines, from the Heavy Cruisers *USS Philadelphia* and *USS Augusta*, operating in conjunction with a battalion-sized force of French Marines landed on the

islands of Pomegues, Chateau d'If, and Ratonneau. These three islands were strategically located in the Bay of Toulon—in German hands they could effect Allied communications and resupply efforts during the Riviera Campaign. After extensive bombardment, the Marines landed. Instead of stout German resistance, however, they encountered a large number of second-line troops who were more than willing to surrender. All three islands were occupied in a single day: the bi-national Marine force captured 730 prisoners without a single casualty.

Conclusion:

Two things may be gleaned from this brief review: first, that Marines did serve—both as individuals and in small units—in the ETO. For that reason alone, under certain circumstances, ASLRB section G17.15 must be suspended. The second thing that becomes clear is that Marines did not see any extensive operational use in Europe and thus should not be used indiscriminately in ETO scenarios. Between these two poles, some room exists for modification and experimentation. This is not only true of the Marine issue, or of D-Day, but can be applied as a general statement for the entire corpus of ASL®: while the game can be enjoyed as nothing more than a game, it can be enjoyed better and with greater intensity as a hands-on history lesson.

PdH Special Offer...

We want you to have a piece of Pointe du Hoc. Order your copy of PdH referencing this offer by sending your check or money order (or Visa/Mastercard #, plus exp. date) for \$32.95 + \$4.00 S & H worldwide to: Critical Hit, Inc. c/o SAND, PO Box 279, Croton Falls, NY 10519 or phone to our order line at 914-278-9125, ext. 3 (or fax to 914-278-4822). You may also order on the web at www.CriticalHit.com and get your sand by sending us the E-mail referenced on the web ordering page. We can't do much more to get *you* on the beach at Pointe du Hoc so order now while supplies last!

POINTE DU HOC

Variants

by Dr. Abraham J. Edelheit

By now, most readers will either own or have played the Critical Hit Pointe du Hoc (PdH) module. For what my opinion is worth, PdH is the best ASL® module ever published bar none. Granted, my opinion plus \$1.50 will get you on the New York subway, but as an avid devotee of anything to do with the U.S. Army Rangers, the PdH module is more than satisfying. In fact, I would say this is perfection—if only because it offers us a much needed “fix” for those of us who aspire to play with cardboard U.S. elite units. Yet, sometimes even perfection can be improved on. Hence, the following two recommendations for variant play based on recent research into D-Day and particularly the action at Pointe du Hoc. Keep in mind either, or both, can easily be integrated into the module, but should be used only on the agreement of both players.

1. A Note on the PdH Board:

According to U.S. Army after action reports collected in 1946 and published in *Small Unit Actions* (see bibliography), Colonel Rudder's first CP was established in a cave directly in front (i.e., southward) of the beach where Col. Rudder's LCA landed. According to my estimate, based on where Rudder's LCA made landfall (relative to the other LCAs), the cave would be located in level 0 of either hex MM16 or MM17. The latter seems to be the most logical location for the cave from a purely game perspective, but I am not 100%

sure that is the location. I think the best approach is to let the American player separately mark the location of the cave prior to set up, with the cave activated (if at all) after American forces land. The cave would be, in effect, set up HIP.


Although the Germans probably knew about caves around the Pointe, they made no use of them as fortifications. Therefore, no German unit may ever set up IN nor may they (in case of an absolute Ranger disaster) ever enter the cave. In this case the Rangers benefit from the cave in a similar manner as the Japanese, with one major exception: they cannot dig any tunnels and gain no victory points by only occupying the cave.

The CP was operational only for a short period of time and was later used as a collection point for wounded Rangers who were to be evacuated. To be sure, the cave will not play a major role in a Campaign Game, and for practical reasons will only be useful in scenario PdH1. Still, players might want to incorporate it into play, especially since it gives the SFCP a location safe from German flanking fire coming from the eastern portion of the board (that 20L AA gun can be a real killer in the game—as it was in real life) during the early rounds of a full Campaign Game.


2. The Marine Variant to PdH:

Prior to playing this variant readers are strongly advised to read the accompanying article in this publication. The variant suspends the ASL® Rule Book, section G17.15, permitting the

1. Colonel Rudder's Cave CP



2. Marines at Pointe du Hoc



American player to purchase up to two Marine Reinforcement Groups (RG).

For this variant, players should add the following data to the American CG Card: ID = 112; Group Type = Marine Ship Detachment; Unit Type = 3 x 6-6-8 USMC Squads; 1 x 2-6 LMG; 1 x DC; CP = 14; FF Max = 2; CG Max = 2. When purchased each RG makes a separate DR on the leader generation table. However, the first RG (or only, if one is purchased) gets a -2 DRM to this roll; if both RGs are purchased, then, the first gets a -2 DRM and the second gets a -1 DRM. In any case, only one officer of 9-2 or better may accompany the Marine RG(s).

The Marine RG(s) can only be purchased for the 6/6/44 PM CG Firefight and must enter during that firefight. The RG(s) may enter on any ocean edge hex, automatically being provided with 2 x LCA for that purpose. If for any reason the RG(s) does not enter during the appropriate CG FF, it is forfeited.

The Marine RG(s) will remain on board for the 6/6/44 Night FF and for the 6/7/44 AM FF. During the RePh of the 6/7/44 PM FF, a dr is made: on a 1-3 the Marines remain on board; on a 4-6 they are withdrawn (remove them from the board, no LCAs are needed). If withdrawn, the Marines will also take any Heroes generated from their ranks, their leaders, and their initial support weapons with them, so it is important to keep records of the Ids of any such units created. There is an optional modifier to this dr: every 5 CP that the American gives

up reduces the dr by -1. If the Marines remain on board for the 6/7/44 PM FF they will automatically remain on board for the Night FF, but the procedure is repeated during the 6/8/44 AM FF RePh. In this case there is a +1 drm to which is added a +1 drm for each Marine squad that has been eliminated.

I realize that this variant adds a bit of complexity to the PdH CG. It certainly adds additional bookkeeping, which I am usually loath to do. However, it also adds a bit of variety to the game: it certainly brings the U.S. Marines to Europe, despite the ASLRB. And, as can be seen from the accompanying article, Marines in Europe were not as much of a fantasy as they seem at first glance.

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Items marked with an Asterisk (*) are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20401. Books can be ordered with a major credit card by telephone at (202) 512-1800 or via the internet at www.access.gpo/su_docs.

A note on the U.S. Government Printing Office is in order. Any student of military history, no matter the era, that has not discovered the wide array of books, pamphlets, maps and more available at a low cost from the U.S. Government is urged to log on to the above web address without delay to see a complete listing of the publications available. You may also phone and request a complete catalog. It is suggested you order using a credit card; books in stock are promptly shipped when ordered by phone or on the web and you are advised if they are in stock. Books ordered by mail using a check or money order may take months to be processed.

The BAR Gunner in PdH

...controversy and historicity



by Raymond J. Tapio

Without a doubt, the most interesting and controversial new rule in Pointe du Hoc is the BAR Gunner (PdH I.17). When the module was first released, feedback was immediate, and polarized, regarding this new SMC. To put it mildly, the internet lit up like a Christmas tree with commentary both pro and con.

The BAR Gunner came to be known in the PdH playtest circles as 'the rule born in an interview'. But let's take a step back before we get to our interview subject. When designer Mark Porterfield first suggested a module depicting the landing of the 2nd Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoc on D-Day, concerns were raised regarding the 'fun' factor. After all, the Ranger forces consisted of a couple of hundred infantry. No tanks. At least the Germans could arguably see the 100th Ersatz Panzer Battalion included in a campaign game; they were not far from the area and could have been deployed. But an overview of the ASL® game system would seem to point to an ongoing trend since the *infantry-based* core of Squad Leader toward more armor, 'funnies', esoterica and German Marines. Who in the modern-day ASL® hobby would want to play with twenty-two squads and a few leaders as their order of battle?

Arguing in the favor of PdH was the evident fact that this particular action was perfect for the scale of ASL®. The battle could be recreated literally, man for man, a claim no HASL module to date could come close to. After all, there's no need to scale things down when only a few

companies are involved *in toto*. We decided to press forward and the design was commissioned. That's when Phil Nobo and Alan Yates entered the scene. Phil and Alan traveled to Normandy for a detailed map design exercise, walking the battlefield from stem to stern. For Nobo, a graphics professional with his own thriving business in London's SOHO, it was a flexing of his professional muscle in the form of a computer cartography assignment. For Yates, the father of Nobo's fiancé, it was the realization of a lifelong dream to walk the battlefields of Normandy.

With a map complete, the next phase of the project involved interviewing veterans of the battle. A quick check located William 'L-Rod' Petty, the oft-quoted Ranger Sergeant of Cornelius Ryan (and just about every author who has prepared a treatise on the subject) and "The Longest Day." Ray Tapio of Critical Hit arrived at Petty's residence to find 'L-Rod' and his son waiting with cold Budweisers in hand. A copy of our game map was unrolled and Petty traced his steps through the battle. 'L-Rod' served as a BAR Gunner and as the interview went on a surprising realization began to be apparent: we could not accurately represent this action using the ASL® game system!

Typical Ranger tactics involved a squad being deployed as three elements: two half-squads and a BAR Gunner. What's more, according to 'L-Rod', "we couldn't care less who the other guys were", a point relating to recombining in game terms. The Rangers were trained to fight as fire

teams; a HS and BAR Gunner would cover the advance/retreat of the other HS; a new firebase would be formed for the subsequent 'leapfrog' maneuver. While additional research would follow the Petty interview, it was then that the BAR Gunner (used as an OPT. Rule after the interview, but before the publication of Pointe du Hoc, in Shanley's Hill) was born.

The 'con' feedback for the BAR Gunner, for the most part, was from purists, displeased with any change to the ASLRB as printed. We surmise these guys were never SL-COI-COD-GI players based on their feedback and apparent lack of experience with the *evolving* nature of the rules system that eventually became ASL®. There's no point in dismissing such criticism, it's just that 'L-Rod' in cardboard is here to stay and we can't answer the criticism of purists except to recommend they not use the rules or counters for BAR Gunners.

Most of the feedback was of the 'pro' variety and the fact that the game sold out rather quickly seems to lend some credence to the 'vote' represented by a *purchase* of the game (Note: PdH is back in print as of July 1, 1999). The feedback of these gamers indicates the goal of making the use of realistic infantry tactics was met, along with the ancillary, but equally important goal of making the game more *fun*. Guys like playing with BAR Gunners. The rules as published in PdH are holding up pretty well, but we suggest you send in your feedback with any suggested changes and note the following rule addition developed by CH's Dave 'Ogre'

Dally:

PdH 1.15 CASUALTY REDUCTION: A BAR squad that suffers casualty reduction (A7.302; A11.11; A15.42) must make a subsequent dr: a dr of 1-2 results in the elimination of the BAR Gunner; a dr 3-4 results in the elimination of a HS; a dr 5-6 results in the elimination of a HS and a BAR Gunner.

One concern raised was about the *number* of BAR Gunners that could be in play at one time. An easy response to this is to limit the number of BAR Gunners allowed in a particular scenario, say along the lines of 10% FRU. The problem is each squad may realistically seek to deploy in its normal fashion, using a BAR firebase. A check of the map on page 11 of this publication indicates no less than *eight* BAR Gunners listed *individually* by the unit historian during the night attack of June 6/7; that signals their importance in the eyes of the historian, and for our game purposes flies in the face of limitations in the form of game artifice.

So what would stop the Ranger player from deploying an army of little BAR-toting men in every situation? First off, by Deploying in the same manner as Finns (A25.7-25.71), they must roll a '6' or less to Deploy. Not a major obstacle, but statistically not in their favor during a particular RPH. A more important consideration is the relative vulnerability of HS on the battlefield. As a 3-4-7 HS, the Rangers lose Assault Fire bonus and cannot use Spraying Fire. What's more, a 'K' result eliminates a HS, possibly opening a hole in your line at a critical juncture of the game. But the main weakness of the HS on this battlefield with its opportunities for CC due to so much cover, is the loss of the inherent Melee advantage the '7' FP squad has over its '4' and '5' FP opponents. Against 4-6-7, 4-4-7 and 4-3-6 German squads, CC is conducted at 3:2 on the **attack** while the enemy comes back with a 1:2 in return. Attacks against 5-4-7 squads are conducted at 1:1, but 'return fire' is still at 1:2. The tables are almost literally turned when 3-4-7 HS fight it out at close quarters with their German squad-sized counterparts.

So when and how does one make best use of the BAR Gunner? One of

the best usages is during a fall-back situation. You need to keep the enemy off your heels while your force makes a retrograde movement. Deploy into two HS and a BAR Gunner and leave one of the three (or two, depending on your needs) to cover your retreat. A similar approach covers the advance: use a firebase of a HS + BAR Gunner (4 FP) as the other HS moves up to search or otherwise probe the ground ahead for enemy troops. BAR Gunners and the deployment opportunities available to Rangers also allow you to cover more ground with the limited men at hand. The campaign game and a number of the scenarios included in PdH lead to the need for 'perimeter' thinking, to cover the Germans in their defensive belt, or enemy troops perched on your flank around GG2, as well as to guard hedgerow fields. In these situations you can use your half-squads and BAR Gunners to put some firepower where you need it to protect against enemy encroachment; even the '1' and '3' FP of BAR/HS are useful against units moving in open ground when the alternative is to leave openings unguarded.

When you need to force the enemy to break upon your wall of firepower, recombine back into 7-6-7 squads, with all their Assault and Spray Fire capabilities and make a few 3-squad firegroups (21 FP) to get the job done.

In game terms it is premature to say we've found the ultimate tactics for these new SMC counters. They are too new for such claims. However, it is not advisable you simply discount them in your play of PdH.

The Rangers and BAR Gunners in PdH...



1.1 U.S. ARMY RANGERS: Ranger squads have a 7³-6-7 strength factor (A1.2).

1.11 Rangers are Commandos (H1.24). Their Morale Level (A1.4) is underlined to denote their ELR of 5 (A19.13).

1.12 Ranger Half squads have a strength factor of 3-4-7. Use U.S. Elite HS (in the ASL® counter mix). Their ML is also considered underlined.

1.13 Rangers may voluntarily declare Hand-to-Hand CC (J2.31).

1.14 Ranger squads may Deploy (A1.31) without a Leader as per the rules for Finnish troops (A25.7) (EXC: Rangers must pass a NTC without the +1 DRM). A deployed Ranger squad is replaced by two 3-4-7 HS and a 1-6-8 BAR gunner (1.17).

1.15 Rangers may recombine as per A1.32 with two possible combinations: two Ranger 3-4-7 HS with a BAR gunner recombine to form a 7-6-7 squad; two 3-4-7 HS *without* a BAR gunner recombine to form a normal U.S. 6-6-7 squad (EXC: this 6-6-7 squad is considered a Ranger squad and PdH 1.11-1.14 apply.)

1.16 A Ranger 7-6-7 squad that suffers casualty reduction (A7.302; A11.11; A15.42) must make a subsequent dr: a dr of 1-3 results in a 3-4-7 and a BAR gunner; a dr of 4-6 results in a 3-4-7 HS and a BAR counter. A BAR is the equivalent of an ATR with a ROF of 1 and a range of 6.

1.17 BAR GUNNER: A BAR gunner is treated like a Hero (i.e., wounds, does not break, mark with a Wounded counter if necessary, has 6 MF, does not count for CVP) armed with a 1-6 BAR (EXC: they have no Heroic modifier and will Pin). A BAR counter is left in the hex (EXC: Random SW destruction [A9.74] applies and any MMC/SMC stacked with the BAR gunner may attempt Recovery as per A4.44) in the event the BAR Gunner is eliminated. The BAR Gunner may *not* Transfer his BAR, even if wounded. The BAR malfunctions on a DR of 12 and is eliminated on a repair dr of 6. Any BAR Gunner that possesses a malfunctioned BAR is considered unarmed (A20.5), which is signified by placing a malfunctioned counter. A BAR Gunner is eliminated along with the malfunctioned BAR counter on a repair dr of 6.

1.171 BAR Gunners have 1 IPC, and as such may *not* portage any additional SW, even if unarmed as per 1.16 due to BAR malfunction.

1.172 PRISONER STATUS: Should a Ranger squad become a Prisoner (A.20), no BAR gunner/BAR counter is created.

POINTE DU HOC

POINTE DU HOC

...Errata and clarifications

Here are the latest clarifications and errata for Pointe du Hoc:

FIREFIGHTS:

PdH #2 Road Warriors: Objectives should read "paved road (S6 - O21)" not "paved road (T6-Q21)".

PdH #3 Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: The US set up should read, "...set up \leq 10 hexes from hex KK13 [EXC: OO13, GG5 and HH4]" to add GG5 and HH4 to the hexes the US cannot set up in. Board Layout should read (Only hexrows N-RR are in play).

PdH #4 The Longest Night: The Americans may set up "on/north of hexrow K".

PdH #5 Rangers Relief: Reference to P28 in Ranger entry area and Objectives should be N29. The reference to "within ten hexes of OO13" is replaced with "to EE12" and thus the Objectives should be interpreted as N29-EE12.

RULES:

BAR Gunner: Only a Good Order, unwounded BAR Gunner may Recombine into a squad. A BAR Gunner may not Recombine in any other combination other than 2 x 3-4-7 + 1 x BAR Gunner = 7-6-7 Ranger Squad.

Para 2.3 line 1: "H15" should be "HH15".

Para 2.5 line 3: "(EX: Hex CC17..." should read "(EX: Hex GG17...".

Para 2.51 line 5: "GG18" should be "GG17" and "arrow" there are no arrows.

Para 2.51 line 6: "GG17" should be "GG18"

THE MAP:

BOCAGE DEPICTIONS: As in past CH modules, Bocage is depicted by the use of a green hedge on top of a brown background. Hexside N18/N19 is an example of Bocage. Hexside BB21/BB22 is Hedge.

BOCAGE RULES CLARIFICATIONS: There has been no shortage of confusion about just how to play Bocage in the ASL™ system, even with recent errata. To that end, Platoon Leader 2.5 (available in print and via download shortly) will include an official clarification for use in all CH scenarios/firefights/CG. Effective immediately, use the following rules clarification for Bocage:

■ No unit may voluntarily drop Wall Advantage if it is marked with a Fire marker of any kind (eg. Prep Fire/First Fire/Final Fire).

EX: An American 7-6-7 squad in PdH P14 Prep Fires at a German 5-4-7 in P17. The American 7-6-7 is marked with a Prep Fire marker. During the FFPh, the 5-4-7 may fire back at the 7-6-7 (adding a +2 DRM for the Bocage). The 7-6-7 may not declare it is voluntarily dropping Wall Advantage to avoid return fire.

■ A unit behind a Bocage with Wall Advantage which is marked with a Fire marker of any kind may not claim in hex TEM against any fire which has LOS traced to any part of the hexside the unit is claiming Wall Advantage over which does not cross the in hex Obstacle.

EX: Using the above example, a German 5-4-7 squad is in PdH O13. This 5-4-7 may fire at the 7-6-7 during the FFPh with a 5 (+1 for Orchard Hindrance) FP shot, ignoring the building in P14 for TEM purposes.

AP TK# FOR 127L: The AP TK# for the 127L is "25".

The Scenarios of PdH

...tips and tactics



by: CH Staff

Here we bring you some tips and insight into the play of the scenarios of Pointe du Hoc with an eye toward viewing the tactical level ASL® battlefield in terms of its real life counterpart. To that end it is suggested you read the historical excerpts and those from "Busting the Bocage" before reading this article.



PRAISE THE LORD (PdH #1)

The module starts right off by placing the gamers in the thick of the action in the form of the D-Day landing at Pointe du Hoc. The signal, "Praise the Lord" was prearranged to be used to communicate that all the Rangers were up the cliff. The OB-given 350mm NOBA should help the American player 'send' that very signal before this one is over. Of course, simply getting up the cliffs will not ensure victory for the Rangers.

This scenario is *not* for the faint of heart. A trip to Chapter G and the rules

for Landing Craft (12.), Beaches (G13.), NOBA (G14.6) and the PdH rules for Rangers (PdH1.1) and German SMG Squads (PdH1.2), Rope Counters (PdH 3.2), etc. Plenty to learn! Once you've got it all under your belt you are ready for the most exciting (and only) HASL D-Day landing in the ASL® system.

Americans:

As per Special Rule 5, you'll choose three hexes (one per game turn for the first three game turns) for 350mm NOBA attack directed by a Shipboard Observer (G14.68) at level 3. Choose your point of attack and use this NOBA to keep the Germans 'home' in their fortifications, reducing their capability to respond to your landing. You'll also want to explode some of those cliffside DC (see CGSR #10) by obtaining K/KIA results. On turn four your 120mm NOBA kicks in for support and the 350mm missions end. Note you'll be relegated to using (and correcting FFE:2 back to) these pre-selected hexes for the 350's so review the target area and choose carefully. These will not represent any risk to your forces as they'll be playing along the German defenders while your Rangers are heading in off the Ocean overlays.

Use the Pointe du Hoc Play Aid to allocate your personnel and support weapons to their individual LCAs and decide on a section of the map to hit with your attack. Splitting your force is not advised: 18 squads worth of Rangers in the first wave seems like, and is a substantial force; half that number split on two sides of the 'point' at PPI2/PP13 is not and can

be defeated in detail.

A good sector for the attack is the western-most beaches between hexes LL19 and JJ28. The Bocage running from DD18/19 to JJ18/19 provides good cover for an assault on the west flank of the German defensive belt. The only fortification is the trench in JJ21, and once that is cleared, there is a good chance you'll be able to use that Bocage protection to your advantage.

Germans:


Your force is outnumbered 2:1 and the Americans have all the firepower. What's a good German to do? Hide! As per Special Rule 4, your entire OB may set up using HIP, albeit a modified form in which your units are placed on board concealed when an enemy unit has a LOS to them. Nevertheless, this option can keep your opponent guessing (and hopefully wasting some NOBA) for a good while.

Your defensive belt on the Pointe must be held, making this a classic Point Defense, with no pun intended. You *must* hunker down in the objectives with your men or you'll watch the Rangers waltz in and onto your bunkers and gun pits. That said you'll need to review the ground and decide where to put some defenders, poised to respond to the Ranger attack. The hamlet of Le Bavent (hexes BB9/19-AA10) is one place to spot some 'trip wire' defenders that can move into the action behind the Bocage to their north.

St. Pierre Du Mont is a bit to the rear of the battlefield, granted, and the path to your defensive belt is blocked

by your own minefields. But, your engineers were kind enough to leave a gap or tow for you to head through, such as the road at X18, which you can use as a redeployment point. Note the American player must prerecord his 350mm NOBA target hexes before play and realize you'll likely have plenty of time to respond to his seaborne invaders as they slowly reveal their point of attack by pointing their LCAs toward a particular part of the beach. You'll need to recognize that the western flank of your defensive belt is most vulnerable because of that Bocage at JJ18/19 to DD18/19 and a few squads ready to sortie out of St. Pierre du Mont at the right moment can make the difference.

As for your 20mm AA guns, place one in JJ21, one in HH4 and another in a gun pit such as GG17 and let them rip as long as they're around. All of your machine-guns can be manned by the provided 1-2-7 crews, freeing your squads for greater coverage of the defensive zone. Finally, get familiar with those Gun Bunkers (PdH 2.6). They're a little tricky but present interesting defensive opportunities with a little study.



ROAD WARRIORS (PdH #2)

The Americans are ashore and elements of D, E, and F Companies strike out for the lateral Vierville-Grandcamp highway, the D514. The classic small unit action across the hedgerows as some eighty-three Americans strike out for their first D-Day objective. This scenario turned out to be a favorite among the playtesters as contest after contest came down to the last dice roll of the last turn.

Americans:

My guys are Fanatic. I have a lengthy line to concentrate my attack against and all I need is one MMC across the highway to win. Sign me

up. Of course, there's a rub. The Germans can be set up literally in my face and they have artillery and machine-guns. That said, every game in this writer's playtest experience in which the German player tried to blow the American away from up front positions led to heavy early American casualties and Ranger victory as their reinforcements, allowed to enter anywhere along the north edge, used the 'fixing' of the defenders by the beleaguered initial group to outflank and race for the highway.

Time is not your ally as it's a long way to the D514 through some pretty thick terrain and the mine and wire belt must be negotiated to get there. You'll have to be aggressive and push hard with your initial group. Get that SFCP party into the trench in II15 and get some NOBA down on any German defenders to your front. The rest of your force, deploying into a few HS and BAR Gunners should slowly work forward from one foxhole/crater to another, keeping fire on the enemy at all times. Remember that your guys are Fanatic when those MC start coming down.

Your reinforcements are the key to victory. If the German goes for the up front defense, keep the pressure on and bring your new units in on the inevitable weak flank that any serious frontal commitment will leave. Don't be afraid to split your reinforcements into two groups despite only having one leader entering with them. Since you'll know where they'll enter, maybe a leader from the initial group can be 'weaseled' out to join their new guys for the big push. The easiest place the reach the highway is the gap in both wire and mines around S10-U9. Heading that way with some of your troops may draw off enough German strength to get through elsewhere.


Germans:

Forget the up front defense, it's a loser every time. That's not to say you shouldn't cover the initial American entry area between II9-II15 with some firepower. Just use enough to delay them from racing forward during the initial turns and accept your task is to delay. Examine your mine and wire

belt. After all, *your* engineers put it there. It's an integral part of your order of battle for this scenario so ignoring it has a simple to communicate consequence: you lose.

You may set up two squads/equivalents HIP and up to three may deploy. This is crucial. The longer you can keep the American guessing about the location of your HIP units, the slower and more cautious he'll have to be. Note also you can HIP any SMC/SW with the two hidden squads and start planning some traps. The combination of HIP units and dummy counters will leave the American guessing about the extent of your defense. Remember your dummies can move behind Bocage without being revealed.

This battle will be won or lost in the last group of hedgerowed in fields north of the mine and wire belt. Examine *each* field (a field being defined as having at least three sides bordered by hedge/Bocage), noting fall back capabilities that will start you off concealed for the next turn, and covering *yet another field* of open ground in front of the Rangers. Cover the gaps with fire. The second level of Q21 has some interesting LOS opportunities for your observer and Manoir St. Pierre serves as the bulwark of one end of your line. Le Guay is directly in the center. And Le Bavent allows you to fall back through the gap around S10, *ahead* of the attacking Americans. There are myriad ambush spots for HIP units and we've seen some good ones go down from T20, BB10 and U9. Do not forget your Fire Lane opportunities.



NOWHERE TO RUN, NOWHERE TO HIDE (PdH #3)

Germans to our front, Germans to our rear. This is the big infantry melee that broke out later on D-Day as

the defenders responded to the Ranger attack. Now the Rangers are in the German defense belt, except for those Krauts hanging on in the OP Bunker. Another group of Rangers are near the lateral highway when a strong German counterattack comes in.

Americans:

My force is split and the Germans have wide latitude where they can enter from to begin their attack. As the American, your first order of business is to fall back with your advanced elements exposed around T10. If they are annihilated, that group alone represents a potential 16 CVP for the Germans, allowing the enemy to pick off a few more squads in the long haul for an easy win.

Unfortunately, your task of falling back with your exposed group will be hampered by the ability of the Germans to enter on the south edge and the east edge on/south of hexrow W. The enemy group around GG2 also poses a threat, especially if they push your fall-back units east, into the attackers from the 914th Regiment. Those realities force you to commit some of your units set up within ten hexes of KK13 to assist their strung-out comrades in their fighting withdrawal. The T10 group can set up as far north as hexrow X; the KK13 group can set up as far south as hexrow AA. Le Bavent can be used as a linchpin of support for falling-back Rangers from the T10 group and the hedgerows around rows 18/19 can be used as delaying positions.

You are going to be hanging on by the skin of your teeth when this is over if you don't concentrate your not inconsiderable firepower (eighteen 7-6-7 squads in the face of no enemy artillery). Just be ready to reunite your companies and turn their massive firepower to face the greatest German threat. Consider using your NOBA to stonk the GG2 enemy while readying a wall of Rangers to cut onrushing 914th Regiment attackers to pieces as they cross the open fields.

Germans:

The initial comment during playtesting was, "how can the Germans lose?" Tactical flexibility; twenty-six squads; and lots of ma-

chine-guns. The Americans are spread out. No LOS (i.e., height positions) exists for mutual support by the defenders. Sounds great, huh?

Your problems include concealed defenders and the onus of attack is on you. You can ill afford to spend too many turns swapping casualties and that American NOBA is pesky, to say the least. Time is also not your ally; with a few delaying BAR Gunners and HS, time can start slipping away as you plod through one Bocage field to another. The lack of rally terrain on the attack can make it tough to regroup after a bad turn, wasting even more precious time.

It is suggested the Germans spread out and split their force. While this may fly in the face of convention in most situations, your group around GG2 is a serious threat to the American flank if your attack is carried forward in strength from the east, with the threat being posed of grabbing those bunkers and weapons pits. And the Americans will have to wrinkle you out of the OP Bunker to avoid giving up five VP right there.

Come through the gap in the minefields at X20 and down the road at V18. Also note the gap in the mines at FF26. A solid wall of Bocage south and west of the defensive belt along hexrow DD/CC and from DD18/19 to JJ18/19 make good jump off points for a final push to relieve your OP Bunker boys. Making that push with a hundred and fifty men might be irresistible if the Rangers make too much of a commitment to penning in your GG2 troops.



THE LONGEST NIGHT (PdH #4)

This is one of the German night attacks of June 6/7, 1944. During the

development process the author had the chance to sit with 'L-Rod' Petty and get a firsthand account of this action and where he was at different times during it. Check the map provided in the historical article elsewhere in this publication for the axis of each German thrust, represented in the scenario by the turn one, three and five reinforcement groups. With the new BAR Gunner rules, and making note of the aforementioned map, the gamer can recreate the positions of the Rangers in a quite literal fashion. Note the errata for this one allowing the Americans to set up "on/north of hexrow K".

Americans:

How does a reduced American company of 72 men stop an attack of over twice their numbers? The attack is disjointed and the defenders are Stealthy. Rolling low doesn't hurt, either. A mystery explosion, possibly an ammo dump going up is simulated by the Blaze counter placed via Random Selection from hex H4.

Do what they did in real life and split into groups of half-squads and BAR Gunners to cover the maximum frontage along the hedgerows. The Germans need to earn at least eleven more VP than you so they'll have to get there via maneuver; they'll never win by slugging it out with you a few squads at a time.

Once the Germans engage your line, which you wisely lengthened as per paragraph two, you can get freedom of movement to be free to deploy and face the enemy threat from whichever direction it comes. Remember not to use those German machine-guns until the very end of the game as you'll be targeted by a SAN check every time you fire them as per E1.76 (and SR #6).

Germans:

Time is our ally here and we have a considerable force of 16 squads and a crew to gain just 12 VP the form of CVP and men north of the highway. The down side is the Americans know which way we are coming from and our force appears in piecemeal fashion.

Both sides are after CVP here so you must not allow your first group

of only four squads to be eliminated before your turn three reinforcements arrive. It is suggested that you simply hunker down with the first group, waiting until turn three to start moving up with ten squads. Note you'll have practically no *firepower* advantage over the enemy at this point but your *maneuver* edge should help in prying him from his line.

There's something to be said for splitting up, forcing the American to do the same to deal with an attack in the west, along the D10 area and another from the I5 area. Whichever side does best for you is where you send your turn five reinforcements, your strongest group. Trying to play smashmouth with the Rangers in a frontal attack with all three waves can simply result in a stalemate, with no assurance of gaining that 12 VP edge you need to win.



RANGERS RELIEF (PdH #5)

What's a good module without a monster scenario? This one's the monster with 30+ squads in action for each side plus armor and artillery wandering about our crater and shellhole strewn battlefield. The German AA section is still hanging on over near HH1; the Rangers are in control of the German defensive belt, hanging on for their lives near the cliffs. A battalion of Krauts is pressing them toward the English Channel. Then we hear the clanking of friendly tanks. It's the cavalry! Note the errata that replaces "P28" in the Objectives with "road hexes from N29 to EE12".

Americans:

We have our *backs to the sea* and a

thirty German squads with artillery support to our front. To our rear are the cliffs. There's only some sixty combat-effective Rangers hanging on with support from the HMS Glasgow. That's the setting here.

Luckily, those 'other' Rangers are coming with men of the 29th Infantry Division and Shermans from the 743rd Tank Battalion. You're advised to know your ASL® stuff as this scenario places an battalion of combat effectives in our hands with armor and artillery support to get the job done. You'll be taking the fight to the enemy across the Bocage (see the article excerpt in this publication from "Busting the Bocage"). You've got ten turns to break through and hold a road open to the desperate Rangers along the cliffs.

Your tanks are an important key to victory but you can't afford to run them forward without support. The Germans have a target of 60 CVP they need to earn to ensure victory, whether you open up that relief road or not. Lose even four tanks and even average infantry losses will doom you to failure.

A reading of the excerpt from Doubler's "Busting the Bocage" is suggested as you are advised to conduct a steady combined-arms assault, seizing one field after another as you head from the east edge toward your cut off comrades. Look to secure your route by cutting a swath through the German defenders. Remember, you'll need to secure your route, a task made all the easier by the lack of HIP German units in this scenario (i.e., no last turn sleaze plays).

You'll have to keep pressure on the enemy from the start to avoid giving the German the luxury of grabbing back all of the defensive belt and forcing you to dig them out at end game. That portion of the German Objectives is tough; they need to hold the OP Bunker, blockhouses and weapons pits to win.

Germans:

An infantry battalion with abundant artillery support in the form of two 105mm batteries. Lots of machine-guns and *Panzerschrecks*, plus the usual allotment of *Panzerfausts*. What

foe can go toe to toe with this kind of a force?

With the exception of the small knot of Rangers to your rear, the entire countryside represented by the PdH map is your oyster. If it's anything, this scenario is a test of your map reading and terrain analysis skills. All those acres and you can plop your troops down almost anywhere. It can also be a distraction and it is suggested an evening be spent preparing your defense. This is no tournament quickie if you want to derive maximum enjoyment out of the experience.

Set your sights on dogged resistance to the Americans opening that road to their cutoff troops. Along the way, try and nail a tank anytime one gets a little bold. Hide your *Panzerschrecks* by careful stacking or use of concealment counters and you may spring a surprise or two on an unwary Sherman crew.

This will be a pitched battle and you'll be able to set up with hopes of using massed artillery and machine-gun fire as the Americans come across the fields. Think along those lines, not 'nickel and dime' one-squad-at-a-time tactics and you'll not only have a better chance at success, you'll be simulating the command of a battalion in the field.

Keep a careful count of the CVP you earn and look to win this one down the stretch after hours of gaming. Forget trying to grab the defensive belt back, it's a sucker play.

CH on the web...

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The latest and most extensive errata and clarifications are found at our web site and a full catalog of over 40+ items you can order using our secure server is on line at the site.

Busting the Bocage

...hedgerow combat tactics on the offense and defense

An excerpt from *Busting the Bocage: American Combined Arms Operations in France, 6 June—31 July 1944*, by Captain Michael Doubler, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1955

The formidable barriers presented by the hedgerows and the military characteristics of the Bocage seem to have taken First Army by complete surprise. Despite Allied planners' awareness of the nature of the Bocage, American commanders had done little to prepare their units for fighting among the hedgerows. Preoccupied with the myriad problems of the D-Day landings, American leaders had failed to see the battlefield in depth and had paid little attention to the potential problems of hedgerow combat. As early as 8 June, General Bradley called the Bocage the "damndest country I've seen." General Collins of VII Corps was equally surprised by the nature of the hedgerow terrain and told General Bradley on 9 June that the Bocage was as bad as anything he had encountered on Guadalcanal. Brigadier General James M. Gavin, the assistant division commander of the 82d Airborne, best summarized the surprise of the senior American leadership: "Although there had been some talk in the U.K. before D-Day about the hedgerows, none of us had really appreciated how difficult they would turn out to be."

The junior leadership within First Army shared their seniors' surprise. In a survey conducted after the Normandy battles, not 1 out of 100 officers questioned stated that they had prior knowledge of the nature of the hedgerows. A summary of these interviews stated that the officers as a whole were "greatly surprised" by the Bocage. Captain Charles D. Folsom, a company commander in the 329th Infantry of VII Corps' 83d In-

fantry Division, admitted that the hedgerows presented a problem his unit "had never before encountered" and that preinvasion training had "not taken the hedgerows into consideration."

Even though the hedgerows were serious impediments to offensive operations, the primary obstacle holding up the American advance was the German defense. As First Army fought its way inland, it discovered that the German Army was well prepared and adept at defending the hedgerow country. The German defense was organized in depth and designed to destroy the coordination and momentum of American attacks while exploiting the defensive advantages of the hedgerows. The forward German defensive line was a series of interconnected, compartmentalized fields. Small detachments defended each field and its surrounding hedgerows. Behind these forward positions, the Germans organized a defensive zone consisting of echeloned belts of prepared battle positions. Available tanks and assault guns were distributed throughout the battle zone to blunt American attacks and to support German counterattacks.

In addition, the Germans organized each field as a defensive strongpoint and confronted the attacking Americans with a deadly mixture of direct and indirect fires (see figure 2). The Germans employed their direct-fire weapons to trap American infantrymen in a deadly hail of cross fire and grazing fires coming from all sides. Machine guns were the primary weapons of the German defense. At the

opposite corners of each field, the Germans emplaced heavy machine guns in positions dug into the earthen embankments of the hedgerows. The purpose of the heavy machine guns was to pin down attacking infantrymen in the open, making them easy targets for small arms and preplanned indirect fires. Light machine guns and machine pistols supplemented the fire of the heavy machine guns and were emplaced in other firing positions to the front and flanks of the attackers. The Germans also used their light machine guns to place bands of grazing fire along the bases of hedgerows paralleling the American attack. The purpose of the grazing fire was to inflict casualties on American infantrymen seeking cover and concealment during their advance. Indirect fire was a key component of the German defense. Once pinned down in the open, preplanned artillery and mortar fire punished American units. German mortar fire was particularly effective, causing as much as 75 percent of all U.S. casualties during the Normandy campaign.

The Germans also implemented other measures to improve their scheme of hedgerow defenses. They habitually dug slit trenches into the hedgerow embankments to protect themselves during American artillery and mortar barrages. Furthermore, German commanders linked together their defensive positions with wire communications that allowed them to coordinate the defense of their sector. Snipers also were an important part of the German defense. They were used to protect machine-gun positions

against infiltrating Americans and to deliver harassing fire during lulls in the action. Booby traps and mines abounded within the thick vegetation of the hedgerows. Trip-wire explosives were a German favorite. To combat American armor at close range, German infantry used the *panzerfaust* (a light, portable weapon, fired by one man, that launched an armor-piercing rocket). At longer ranges, Germans engaged American armor with tank main guns, self-propelled guns, and used the legendary 88-mm antiaircraft gun in a ground-defense mode.


The early fighting in Normandy demonstrated the effectiveness of the German defensive system. American infantry commanders soon realized that normal tactical maneuvers were impossible in the Bocage. Company commanders initially used conventional methods of attack, with two rifle platoons abreast followed in turn by the third rifle platoon and the weapons platoon. However, companies could not deploy and maneuver because of thick vegetation and the compartmentalized nature of the terrain. Platoons were forced to hack their way through the dense vegetation because German defensive fires covered all natural breaks in the hedgerows. As leading attack elements emerged from the hedgerows, they found themselves exposed to almost point-blank German machine-gun fire. Pinned down in the open in the middle of a well-prepared kill zone, infantrymen were unable to maneuver and continue the attack. Squads returned fire with their own rifles and automatic weapons, but their firepower was not enough to suppress the defenders. American commanders quickly discovered that four or five German defensive positions could pin down an entire infantry battalion and hold up an attack for long periods.

Unable to use normal techniques of fire and maneuver, American commanders were also powerless to influence the battle with increased firepower. Heavy vegetation and the close proximity of the German defenders made it impossible to bring forward and set up heavy machine guns. Com-

pany commanders used their organic 60-mm mortars in an attempt to knock out German machine-gun positions. However, the hedgerows and the close combat conditions made the observation and adjustment of mortar and artillery fire almost impossible. American and German units often fought one another at ranges of less than 300 yards. Short distances made calling for artillery fire risky, since unadjusted rounds could easily land on friendly troops. Many engagements were fought at such close range that even if friendly rounds landed on German positions, the effects of shrapnel and concussion would endanger American

lives. Unable to observe the enemy and to call fire on him from a safe distance, infantrymen were deprived of field artillery and mortar support."

The Bocage also adversely affected command and control of small units. Companies and battalions did not attack along fixed frontages as prescribed in standard doctrine. Instead of attacking along a frontage of between 200 and 500 yards, company-size attacks were canalized into single fields. Likewise, battalions attacked on fronts as narrow as 300 yards in order to seize a group of adjacent hedgerow fields. Standard control measures and boundary lines between



units were almost meaningless in the compartmentalized terrain. Commanders learned to orient their attacks along roads and paths running through the Bocage. At the company level, maintaining proper orientation during an attack proved difficult. Hemmed in on all sides by the hedgerows, platoons lost their sense of direction and without a fixed reference point often became disoriented and could not pinpoint their own location on their maps. These orientation problems aggravated normal difficulties in getting platoons and companies to advance under fire.

Bad terrain and the Germans' tactical proficiency were not the only conditions hampering operations. American commanders observed many defects in the training and effectiveness of their troops. As experience in the other theaters had shown, lack of aggressiveness was a major problem in most infantry units. Infantrymen failed to maneuver in order to place more effective direct fire on the enemy. Instead, units maneuvered to locate the Germans and then called for heavy weapons and indirect fire to neutralize the defenders. Even after the artillery had pounded enemy positions, many infantry units were slow in seizing their objectives, General Bradley acknowledged that a major problem in First Army was the infantry's slowness in following their close supporting artillery barrages.

Inexperience in combat also hampered infantry units. In battle for the first time, infantrymen had to rely on their training and leaders to get them through the initial trauma of combat. Many had to learn how to survive through their own experiences and from the misfortunes of others. Green troops of all ranks had a tendency not to move under fire, preferring the protection of the closest cover or simply hugging the open ground. German snipers were a particular source of fear. The experience of a platoon leader in the 9th Division illustrates how untried troops can react under fire:

One of the fatal mistakes made by infantry replacements is to hit the ground and freeze when fired upon.

Once I ordered a squad to advance from one hedgerow to another. During the movement one man was shot by a sniper firing one round. The entire squad hit the ground and they were picked off, one by one, by the same sniper.

For normal infantrymen, becoming "battle wise" was a terrible, if not fatal, experience.

Tankers also found the hedgerow country forbidding. They discovered that vegetation and the compartmentalized nature of the terrain negated their best assets, mobility and firepower. The hedgerows kept the tanks from maneuvering freely, and poor observation prevented the tankers from using their long-range main guns and machine guns. Tanks unaccompanied by friendly infantry were easy targets for German infantry armed with explosives and *panzerfausts*. Reluctant to operate within the confined spaces and tangles of the hedgerows, tank commanders kept their vehicles road bound. Staying on main roads and paths, however, made the tanks easy targets for the Germans' preplanned antitank defense. Panzers and 88-mm anti-tank guns were sited to take advantage of long fields of fire and covered highways, bridges, and road junctions. Indirect fires were preplanned to strike American armor moving along highways. Early in the campaign, tankers attempted to execute massed attacks in columns down the Normandy highways-blitz actions that were ineffective and costly. The Germans stopped a typical American tank attack on 15 June, as an armored unit supported the U.S. 120th Infantry of the 30th Infantry Division during an attack southward from Omaha Beach. The American tanks never left the road, while the accompanying infantry operated on the flanks. Within moments, the Germans destroyed the three lead tanks, one immobilized by a mine and two others hit by an 88-mm antitank gun, and the attack ground to a confused halt. Armor leaders soon realized that tanks had to stay off highways to survive. Their only alternative was to operate within the cover and concealment of the hedgerows.

Army doctrine for the coordinated

use of tanks and infantry was ineffective in the Bocage. The hedgerows' earthen embankments and heavy vegetation were almost impassable obstacles for the M-4 Shermans. Tanks could not lead the attack through the hedgerows nor support leading infantry attacks with main-gun and machine-gun fire. Unable to operate through the hedgerows with attacking infantrymen, tanks had to take a passive role and merely followed the main infantry attack, while awaiting suitable opportunities for employment.

Another serious problem that became evident during the early Normandy battles was that tank-infantry coordination was poor. Insufficient combined arms training had been conducted before D-Day. Primarily concerned with the problems of amphibious warfare, infantry divisions failed to train adequately with their assigned tank units. Another difficulty was that supporting GHQ tank battalions were not assigned to their respective infantry divisions until a few weeks prior to D-Day. For example, the 745th Tank Battalion was not assigned to the 1st Infantry Division until 21 April, and tank companies were not attached to individual infantry regiments until they were already in combat after D-Day.

Another cause for poor tank-infantry coordination was that many infantry commanders had not worked with tanks before and lacked sufficient experience concerning how tanks should be used in conjunction with infantry. The exact details of how tanks and infantry should work together were largely neglected until infantrymen and tankers found themselves thrown together among the hedgerows. Many commanders at the battalion level and above were inexperienced in integrating the components of the combined arms team. The operations officer of Collins' VII Corps elaborated on this problem: "More combined training for infantry battalion commanders is needed. They should know how to use all of their tools.... We have had to teach this in battle the hard way. The same also applies to regimental commanders."

A bright spot in the American combined arms teams was the field artil-

lery. Infantry commanders understood artillery doctrine and knew how to best employ their supporting fires. Infantry-artillery coordination was consistently good throughout First Army. When conditions permitted, artillery wreaked havoc on the enemy. German prisoners consistently stated that U.S. artillery fire was extremely effective. Captured officers with experience in Russia believed that American artillery was more powerful and devastating than Soviet artillery.”

Despite the outstanding performance of the infantry-artillery team, several conditions inhibited artillery operations. Ammunition shortages, for one, plagued First Army artillery units throughout the Normandy campaign. Lack of positions from which to observe targets also compelled artillery batteries to fire on unobserved targets and unconfirmed locations of German units. Inadequate observation also restricted counterbattery fires against German artillery and harassing and interdiction fires against targets in the German rear.

The central challenge facing U.S. commanders in Normandy, however, was how to rupture the hedgerow defenses and get their own units moving quickly forward instead of systematically grinding their way through the Germans’ prepared positions. Since the hedgerows and the confined spaces within the beach-head precluded outflanking maneuvers, the only available alternative was the least desirable one: frontal assaults straight into the enemy’s kill zones. American commanders at 0 levels understood that answers to tactical problems had to be found before a stalemate ensued. Methods and techniques had to be devised that would overcome the hedgerow barriers, degrade the German defense, and restore the initiative to the attacker. First Army realized it could not afford the luxury of suspending operations to repair deficiencies in the combined arms team or to determine the very best way of busting the German defenses. Solutions to these problems would have to be found and implemented in the midst of battle.

The Solution

By late June, most commanders throughout First Army realized the peculiar nature of the fighting taking place in the hedgerows. From a tactical standpoint, hedgerow combat was unlike anything the Americans had ever before encountered. Combat consisted of small-unit actions aimed at reducing the German positions in each field rather than sweeping maneuvers to seize major objectives. Veterans with experience in North Africa and Sicily had not encountered anything comparable to the Normandy hedgerows. Similarly, combat training did not prepare unblooded soldiers for the tactical problems unique to hedgerow fighting. Battle in Normandy put a higher premium on leadership and initiative at the small-unit level rather than on generalship. Some commanders compared the hedgerow fighting to combat in jungles or forests. Others said it was more akin to Indian fighting.

The leaders within First Army realized they had to find ways to smash through the German defenses. Unable to out-flank enemy positions, American soldiers had to find ways to restore tactical mobility and to bring more heavy-caliber weapons to bear against the Germans. As they tried to develop techniques that would succeed within the confined spaces of the Bocage, commanders gleaned little help from Army doctrine or standard tactical procedures. Nonetheless, as early as 9 June, First Army headquarters began to grapple with the problem of how to get through the hedgerows. In a conversation with an armor officer on First Army’s staff, General Bradley wondered whether tanks could blow their way through the hedgerows with main-gun and machine-gun fires. Throughout First Army during June and July, officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men contemplated methods to overcome the German defense.

The most obvious solution to the problems of hedgerow combat was for American commanders to find ways to maximize the advantages of the tools most readily available to them: the mobility and firepower of the com-

bined arms team. The key challenge to the U.S. Army was to find ways to bring the separate components of the combined arms teams together in a concerted attack against the German hedgerow defenses. Infantry, armor, and artillery had to be knitted together into an effective fighting team.

Early in the campaign, infantry commanders realized that before their units could maneuver to close with the enemy, they had to find a way to deliver heavy suppressive fires against the Germans. The most obvious solution at hand was to better integrate armor into the attack so as to capitalize on their tanks’ armored protection and firepower. Instead of attacking in separate echelons as prescribed in doctrinal manuals, infantry and armor had to be able to advance simultaneously in the face of German defenses, while mutually supporting one another. If tanks and infantry worked closely together, infantrymen might be able to assault the Germans while Shermans delivered heavy suppressive fire with their machine guns and cannon.

However, before infantrymen and tankers could operate together in the hedgerows, several technical problems had to be solved. The most pressing and difficult problem was to find ways for the First Army’s M-4 Shermans to overcome the physical barrier presented by the hedgerows. Another obstacle to tank-infantry coordination was inadequate communications. If ways could be found for the Shermans to bash through the hedgerows and communicate with their accompanying infantry, tanks would be able to deliver suppressive firepower and help the infantry move forward.

The search for a solution to the armored mobility problem typifies the problem-solving processes that took place throughout First Army. Tank units discovered that Shermans could drive over the top of smaller hedgerows. Negotiating larger hedgerows was a hazardous, if not impossible, task and exposed the tanks’ thin underbellies to antitank fire. The first attempts at penetrating the hedgerows involved the use of specially equipped “dozer” tanks. These tanks were a relatively new in-

vention in 1944 and consisted of M-4 Shermans equipped with a blade similar to those on commercial bulldozers. Dozer tanks normally removed obstacles or improved defensive positions. Early experience in Normandy showed that a dozer tank could push its way through the most formidable hedgerow. Dozer tanks could also widen natural gaps in hedgerows that were too narrow for Shermans to drive through.

However, there were too few dozer tanks in First Army to support large-scale operations on wide frontages. A tank battalion was usually equipped with only four dozer tanks. These tanks were too few in number to support divisional attacks effectively where each infantry regiment might encounter dozens of hedgerows. To alleviate the situation, armor leaders recommended that one tank in each armor platoon be equipped with a blade device. First Army made frantic efforts to increase the number of its dozer tanks. In July 1944, First Army requisitioned 278 dozer blades. However, units could not sit idly by while waiting for supply channels to produce the badly needed dozer blades. Weeks might pass before enough dozer tanks became available


to allow widespread armor operations through the hedgerows.

The urgency of the situation resulted in the development of improvised methods that allowed tanks to maneuver in the Bocage. The first field-expedient solution to the mobility problem came from the 747th Tank Battalion assigned to Major General Charles H. Gerhardt's 29th Infantry Division. The 747th was not equipped with dozer tanks, so instead of trying to drive directly over the hedgerows, someone suggested that demolitions be used to blow gaps in the hedgerows. After experimentation, the tankers discovered that demolitions could indeed breach the hedgerows. Two 24-pound explosive charges placed eight feet apart and eighteen inches above ground level blew a sizable hole in a hedgerow. On 24 June, engineer squads from the 29th Division's 121st Engineer Combat Battalion emplaced demolition charges on hedgerows during a limited attack by elements of the 747th Tank Battalion and the 115th Infantry. The attackers discovered that the 24-pound charges did not always create a hole large enough for the Shermans. After the attack, the engineers decided to increase the size of

the explosive charges from twenty-four to fifty pounds. They hoped the increased charges would consistently blow breaches large enough to accommodate the attacking tanks.

However, several problems resulted from increasing the size and weight of the explosive charges. The commander of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion, Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Ploger, conducted an informal study of the logistics involved in supporting a tank attack with fifty-pound explosive charges. Ploger assumed 'that in a typical attack, a tank company moving a distance of one and one-half miles through the Bocage would encounter thirty-four separate hedgerows. As a result, each tank company needed seventeen tons of explosives. Demolitions were not readily available in such quantities, and the problems involved in the transport and emplacement of enough explosives seemed insurmountable. Apparently, other techniques were needed to breach the hedgerows.

The engineers then suggested that the explosives be buried within the hedgerow embankments. Burying the charges would greatly increase the efficiency of the demolitions, allow the use of smaller charges, and allevi-



ate problems associated with availability, transport, and emplacement. Unfortunately, other conditions prevented the burying of explosive charges. Digging holes large and deep enough for the explosives in earthen embankments covered with vines and filled with roots proved too laborious. During an attack, digging holes and emplacing charges would simply take too long. Since an attack could proceed only as fast as charges were emplaced and detonated, slow-moving American attacks would allow the Germans to coordinate their hedgerow defense better. Engineers and infantrymen would also be dangerously exposed to German mortar fire while planting demolitions. Though technically feasible, burying explosives by hand was a procedure both too difficult and tactically unwise.

Determined to find a way to get through the hedgerows, the tankers and engineers finally developed an effective technique for using explosives. In a conference between officers of the 747th Tank Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel Ploger, someone suggested that the tanks be equipped with a mechanical device to gouge holes in the hedgerows for the explosives. After some experimentation, the tankers finally equipped an M-4 Sherman with two pieces of commercial pipe, each four feet long and six and one-half inches in diameter. The tankers welded the pipes onto the front side of the Sherman's final drive assemblies and reinforced the weld with angle irons. Shermans so equipped simply rammed into a hedgerow embankment and then backed away leaving two sizable holes for the explosives. Ploger's engineers also learned to pack the demolitions into expended 105-mm artillery shell casings, thereby greatly increasing the efficiency of the charges. The engineers found that two charges of only fifteen pounds each could blow a gap large enough for a Sherman tank. Placing explosives in shell casings also made the transport and handling of charges much easier. The method proved so successful that the 747th outfitted numerous tanks with the pipe devices.

Several factors soon led to an even better method of breaching the hedgerows. The tankers discovered

that demolitions took away the element of surprise during attacks. An explosion alerted the Germans that a tank would soon appear through the hedgerows. The detonation clearly marked where the tank would appear, thus forming an aiming point for German machine-gun and antitank fires. A method that did not use explosives would increase the effectiveness of American attacks by restoring the element of surprise.

During experiments to test the feasibility of the pipe devices, the tankers of the 747th discovered that a Sherman equipped with pipes could sometimes plough its own way through smaller hedgerows. Unfortunately, the maneuver frequently bent the pipes or tore them loose from the tank. After observing that tanks with pipes could penetrate some hedgerows on their own, First Lieutenant Charles B. Green of the 747th designed a strong bumper device for use in plowing through the hedgerows. Made from salvaged railroad tracks, the new tank bumper proved strong enough to tear through almost any hedgerow. After proving successful in combat, maintenance teams welded the bumper onto many of the 747th's Shermans.

By late June, many units throughout First Army had developed a variety of means to breach the hedgerows. The 83d Infantry Division in VII Corps used two 25-pound explosive charges. Engineers packed the explosives in a sandbag, buried them by hand two feet into the hedgerow embankment, and then tamped the hole full of dirt to increase the effectiveness of the charge. Other units copied the techniques developed in the 29th Division. The 703d Tank Battalion, attached to the 4th Infantry Division in VII Corps, adopted the 747th's hedgerow-busting techniques and found them "highly successful." In VIII Corps, the 79th Infantry Division also developed another type of hedgerow cutter for use on its Sherman tanks.

Soldiers of the 2d Armored Division's 102d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron invented the hedgerow device that gained the widest publicity. During a discussion be-

tween some of the 102d's officers and enlisted men, someone suggested that they get "saw teeth," put them on their tanks, and cut through the hedgerows. Many of the troops laughed at the suggestion, but Sergeant Curtis G. Culin took the idea to heart. Culin designed and supervised the construction of a hedgerow cutting device made from scrap iron pulled from a German roadblock. Testing showed that the device allowed a Sherman to cut easily through the hedgerows. Because the hedgerow cutter's blades made a tank resemble a large pachyderm with tusks, troops called the device a "rhinoceros," and Shermans equipped with Culin's invention became known as "rhino" tanks. Though the most famous of the hedgerow-reducing devices, Culin's "rhinoceros" was only one of many such contrivances invented and employed throughout First Army.

Culin's device soon got the attention of the chain of command within 2d Armored Division and V Corps. On 14 July, General Bradley attended a demonstration of Culin's hedgerow cutter. Bradley watched as Shermans mounting the hedgerow device plowed through the hedgerows "as though they were pasteboard, throwing the bushes and brush into the air." Very impressed by the demonstration, Bradley ordered the chief of First Army's Ordnance Section to supervise the construction and installation of as many of the hedgerow cutters as possible.

First Army Ordnance assembled welders and welding equipment within the beachhead and from the rear areas in England to assist with the project. Welding teams used scrap metal from German beach obstacles to construct most of the hedgerow cutters. In a prodigious effort between 14-25 July, the First Army Ordnance Section produced over 500 hedgerow cutters and distributed them to subordinate commands for installation. By late July, 60 percent of First Army's Shermans mounted the hedgerow-cutting devices.

Another problem besetting the U.S. Army in the early stages of the campaign was inadequate communications, which prevented close coord-

dination between tankers and infantrymen. The din of battle and roar of tank engines drowned out voice communications between tank commanders and troops on the ground. Infantrymen could not get the attention of tankers who were busy inside their vehicles. The most significant problem was that the majority of tank and infantry radios operated on different wavelengths. Such incompatible equipment made direct radio communications between tanks and infantry platoons impossible. Out of the seven radios authorized in an infantry company, only the company commander's radio transmitted and received with tank radios. Conversely, in a tank platoon only the platoon leader and the platoon sergeant had radios capable of communicating with an infantry company commander's radio. Unable to communicate during combat, infantry squads and tankers failed to coordinate their fires against the Germans.

Eventually, soldiers devised several field-expedient solutions to communications problems. One technique involved the attachment of two infantry field telephones to each tank. Infantrymen strapped one phone onto the rear of a Sherman's back deck and then connected it by wire to a second phone located inside the tank's turret. By using such back-deck telephones, soldiers could direct tankers against concealed German positions. However, infantrymen were forced to expose themselves to enemy fire while talking on the back-deck telephones. Some units tried to solve the problem by letting a long strand of communications wire trail behind the tanks. Infantrymen then connected a field telephone to the end of the trailing wires and talked with the tank's crews from a safer position. However, dangling wires often accidentally broke, pulled loose from the tanks, or got entangled in the tanks' treads. Infantrymen and tank crews discovered the best way to communicate was through the tanks' interphone boxes, which were connected directly into the tanks' intercom systems, and were then mounted on each Sherman's back deck in empty ammunition containers. To talk with the tankers, infantrymen simply plugged a radio handset into the interphone boxes. The hand-

sets' long cords permitted soldiers to lie down behind or underneath the tanks to protect themselves while talking to the tank crews. By mid-July, many divisions in First Army used field-expedient methods for communications between tanks and supporting infantrymen.

Units also found ways to facilitate better radio communications. Both tank and infantry units tried to increase the span of control by procuring additional radios. Tank platoon leaders in some units acquired extra, manpack armor radios for use by the infantry. Other tank units tried to install infantry radios in their vehicles but with poor results. A popular method of increasing command and control by radio was for infantry commanders to ride in the command vehicle of the attached armor unit. By riding in a command tank and using a manpack infantry radio, a rifle company commander could simultaneously control the movement of his platoons and attached tanks.

Troops developed a wide variety of visual signals and standing operating procedures to coordinate actions during battle. Because tankers and infantrymen used different standard hand and arm signals, soldiers had to develop new signals for various functions. Tank-infantry teams invented signals for "commence fire," "cease fire," and to indicate the location of enemy positions. Leaders also used smoke grenades and flares to control their subordinates. Many infantry squad and platoon leaders carried rifles that fired tracer bullets used to mark targets. Infantry commanders learned to assign the same squads to work with supporting tanks and found that familiarity between tank crews and infantry squads greatly increased the soldiers' confidence and proficiency.

Inadequate observation of artillery targets was also a problem that hampered combined arms operations. Operating in the flat hedgerow thickets, forward observers lacked adequate fields of observation to adjust fire onto German forward positions or targets in the enemy's rear. A shortage of forward observers also hampered operations. Artillery battalions normally

assigned one forward observer to each rifle platoon in an infantry company, while tank companies received only one forward observer for use by the company commander. Because tank companies rarely operated as a single unit, tank platoons did not have their own means of calling for fire. Normally tankers sent their requests for fire to the forward observer of their accompanying infantry unit-usually without results. Tank platoon leaders sometimes called for fire by communicating directly with the fire-direction center of their supporting artillery. Unfortunately, armor officers were often incapable of sending correct calls for fire or could not adjust rounds onto targets.

Aerial forward observers were the best solution to the problems of observing enemy targets. In First Army, each division had ten light aircraft assigned for liaison missions, and each corps headquarters had from fifty to seventy aircraft. The airplanes were either L-4 Piper Cubs or the larger L-5 Stinson Sentinels. Besides the pilot, the aircraft carried a skilled forward observer equipped with radios linked to the fire-direction centers of supporting artillery units. Loitering over a designated sector, aerial forward observers called fire on forward enemy positions and valuable targets in the German rear area and adjusted barrages in support of American ground attacks. During the Normandy battles, aerial forward observers conducted the majority of target-fire missions with "universally excellent" results.

Aerial observers also performed numerous other functions. On several occasions, observers adjusted artillery fire to neutralize German gun positions firing on American fighter-bombers engaged in close air support missions. During VII Corps' attack on Cherbourg, air observers adjusted naval gunfire for ground units. Whenever observer aircraft were in the area, German artillery batteries were reluctant to fire for fear of revealing their location and exposing themselves to American counter-battery fire. Air observers also collected tactical intelligence by taking photographs that ground units used in preparing for at-

tacks. The small aircraft were reliable, highly maneuverable, and surprisingly survivable; only nine Piper Cubs were lost during operations in Normandy.

Technical innovations in mobility, communications, and artillery observation were not enough to ensure a coordinated combined arms effort. Small-unit tactics also had to be developed so that indirect fire pounded the enemy while closely coordinated teams of tanks and infantry assaulted German defensive positions. With the problems of armored mobility and tactical communications largely solved, infantry commanders finally realized that firepower from their supporting M-4 Shermans could place heavy suppressive fires on the Germans, thus allowing their units a chance to maneuver. Properly employed, the machine guns of an M-4 Sherman delivered the direct fire needed to suppress German machine guns, while a Sherman's main gun, used at point-blank range, substituted for indirect artillery fire. As tanks suppressed the German defenders, infantry units could clear out the hedgerows and maneuver to assault the main German defensive positions. Infantry could also provide tanks with protection against German close assaults. Throughout First Army, units worked to develop new combined arms tactics. Commanders at all levels began to experiment with methods that permitted infantry and tanks to work closely together. Units trained and conducted rehearsals in rear areas before trying new tactics in combat. The result was the implementation by First Army units of several methods that allowed the combined arm team to overcome the enemy. Events within the 29th Infantry Division best illustrate how the U.S. Army developed and executed new tactical methods. In an attempt to expand the Normandy beachhead, First Army ordered Corlett's XIX Corps to attack the Germans on 16 June and seize prominent terrain north and east of Saint-LO. The XIX Corps ordered Gerhardt's 29th Division to conduct the main attack and to take key terrain near the villages of Saint-André-de-l'Épine and Villiers-Fossard (see map 2). The attack jumped off early on the morning

of 16 June and failed to make any substantial progress against the Germans. By late-afternoon, it was obvious that the 29th Division's regiments would not reach their initial objectives before nightfall. Major General Corlett issued orders for the forward troops to dig in for the night and to prepare to resume the attack the next day. The 29th Division continued to attack for two more days but with few beneficial results. By nightfall on 18 June, the division was exhausted, bloodied, and unable to continue the attack. In this instance, the German hedgerow defense had successfully stopped the best American efforts to smash through the Bocage.

Other operations in the 29th Division's sector also exhibited deficiencies in tank-infantry coordination. An attack on 20 June by the 175th Infantry and Company B, 747th Tank Battalion, against German positions near Villiers-Fossard demonstrated the problems of operating among the hedgerows. Using standard tank-infantry tactics, the tankers led the attack, and the infantry followed. Tankers and infantrymen, however, failed to support one another during the attack and soon became separated, as the tankers blew the hedgerows with explosives and plunged forward alone. German machine guns pinned down the infantry, while the unescorted American tanks soon fell prey to German antitank fires. Company B lost four tanks in the attack, and finally both tankers and infantrymen had to withdraw to their initial positions.

Frustrated by their failures in the hedgerows, leaders within the 29th Division realized they had to find ways to defeat the Germans. General Gerhardt directed the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Norman D. Cota, to supervise the development and implementation of tactics to overcome the German method of hedgerow defense. The tactics developed by the 29th Division were a departure from normal Army doctrine in that neither the tanks nor the infantry led the attack but fought closely together and protected one another while closing with the enemy.

The 29th Division's solution relied on the firepower and maneuver of

small, closely coordinated combat teams. Each team consisted of a single tank, an engineer team, and a squad of infantry reinforced by a light machine gun and a 60-mm mortar from an infantry company's weapons platoon. Before the attack, the infantry and engineers occupied the hedgerow that served as the jump-off position for the assault. The attack began when a Sherman equipped with pipe devices nosed into the hedgerow and opened fire on the Germans with main gun and machine guns. The Sherman first fired a white phosphorous round into the corners of the opposite hedgerow to eliminate German heavy machine-gun positions. The tankers then systematically sprayed machine-gun fire along the entire base of the enemy hedgerow. The 60-mm mortar supported the attack by lobbing shells into the fields directly behind the German positions. The infantry attacked when the Sherman opened fire with its machine guns. The squad moved through the hedgerow deployed on line and advanced across the open field using standard methods of fire and movement. The infantry stayed away from the hedgerows on their flanks to avoid enemy grazing fire. The Sherman continued to support the attack until the infantry's advance masked the tank's machinegun fire. As they closed on the German positions, American infantrymen threw hand grenades over the hedgerow to kill or confuse German defenders on the opposite side. Simultaneously, the Sherman backed away from its firing position, and the engineers emplaced demolitions in the holes left by the Sherman's pipe devices. After the explosives blew a hole in the hedgerow, the Sherman moved forward to provide close support to the infantry squad. The tankers and infantrymen then flushed the hedgerow of any remaining defenders and prepared to continue the attack. The engineer team and machine-gun and mortar crews then displaced forward to support the next assault.

On 24 June, elements of the 29th Division conducted a full rehearsal in the division rear area to test the validity of the new close-assault tactics. An infantry platoon, a tank platoon, and three engineer teams rehearsed the

new tactics during several simulated attacks. Lessons learned during the exercise helped improve the effectiveness of the hedgerow tactics. The infantry discovered a light machine gun could not be moved quickly enough to keep up with their advance. Instead, the infantry preferred to use Browning automatic rifles to provide suppressive fire. Infantrymen also learned to coordinate their attack with tankers by using rear-deck telephones mounted on the backs of the Shermans. Mortar observers discovered that by standing on the Sherman's rear deck, they could see the next hedgerow and adjust rounds onto the German positions. Mortar crews also learned they could help protect the assaulting infantry squad by obscuring German observation with smoke shells. The tankers found out that crew members had to dismount and cut away vegetation to clear adequate fields of fire and observation. The rehearsals made tank commanders realize they had to control their machine-gun fire closely to avoid hitting friendly infantrymen.

After the rehearsal on 24 June, the 29th Division's operations staff prepared diagrams and explanatory notes outlining the new hedgerow tactics in detail. The operations section then distributed the information as a training memorandum to all regiments within the division. Units in the 29th Division practiced and rehearsed the new tactics in preparation for their next bout with the Germans.⁴⁷ On 1 July, General Cota summed up the 29th Division's tactical experience in France:

What held us up at first was that we originally were organized to assault the beach, suffered a lot of casualties among key men, then hit another kind of warfare for which we were not organized. We had to assemble replacements and reorganize. Now we have had time to reorganize and give this warfare some thought. I think we will go next time.

The 29th Division did not have to wait long for an opportunity to use its new combined arms tactics.


On 11 July, XIX Corps attacked southward toward Saint-LO as part of a First Army offensive to push the German Seventh Army out of

Normandy. The XIX Corps ordered the 29th Division to attack and seize key terrain east of Saint-Lo. As part of the division's attack plan, General Gephardt ordered the 116th Infantry to conduct the main attack and capture Saint-André-de-l'Épine, then swing westward and attack along a major ridge-line to take the village of Martinville. The regimental commander then ordered the 2d Battalion, 116th Infantry, to lead the attack with the other battalions following in column. Company B of the 121st Engineer Combat Battalion and Company A of the 747th Tank Battalion supported the 2d Battalion. The lead battalion planned to execute the attack with two rifle companies that had been trained and organized to execute the 29th Division's new hedgerow tactics.⁴⁹

The attack started at 0600 on 11 July after a furious twenty-minute preparatory bombardment by five battalions of artillery. Initial progress was slow and discouraging. The 2d Battalion advanced with two companies abreast and encountered determined resistance from enemy positions in the first hedgerows. The tank-infantry-engineer teams, however, continued to push forward, and by 1100 they finally broke through the organized German defense, which eased and then collapsed. The 2d Battalion then made rapid progress, seized the ridgeline to its front, wheeled to the right, and continued to move. Before nightfall, the 2d Battalion advanced another mile toward Martinville and was in an excellent position to continue the attack toward Saint-Lo.⁵⁰

The 116th Infantry's attack demonstrated the effectiveness of the 29th Division's hedgerow tactics. Compared to other operations in the Bocage, the 2d Battalion's advance made spectacular progress. The battalion achieved a major penetration of the enemy line and completely ruptured the main line of German resistance. General Gephardt attributed the success to tank-infantry-engineer teamwork. Mortars delivered fire on the German positions, tanks provided suppressive fire, engineers breached

the hedgerows, and infantry assaulted the Germans while protecting the Shermans against antitank fires. Infantry casualties were relatively light during the attack, and not one Sherman was lost.



Special Thanks...

To everyone that assisted and encouraged in the publication of *Pointe du Hoc*. To Phil and Alan, who went above and beyond the call of duty to conduct the on-site research (and in Phil's case, *make the map*), including gathering all the sand at the *Pointe* for inclusion in our special PdH offer.

To Mark Porterfield for pressing on with his labor of love and for almost 20 years of SL/ASL® opponent-ing. To Steve and Rob Pleva for their input from their own trip to *Pointe du Hoc*. To Brian Martuzas for his development work.

Our special thanks go to William 'L-Rod' Petty. Mr. Petty was kind enough to provide hours of feedback during our interview, valuable hours of information vital to the game. What more, Mr. Petty provided his own personal and unpublished memoirs; a phone call from his desk and Herm Stein was on the phone OK-ing the use of his own notes. More information came from the Ranger publications 'L-Rod' was kind enough to provide.

For all his assistance, we thank Mr. Petty and dedicate all the hours of enjoyment had by the players of our PdH game to him.





POINTE DU HOC, NORMANDY, 6 June 1944: The destroyer USS Satterlee observed enemy movements and swept the cliff-top with fire from all guns; nevertheless, scattered fire from flanking position caused casualties as the Rangers debarked on the heavily cratered beach. Colonel James Rudder, leading the three companies of Rangers, was one of the first ashore. Germans suddenly appeared on the cliff edge and began to harass the Rangers directly below with rifle fire and hand grenades. This threat was driven back by BAR gunners and another concentration of fire from the USS Satterlee...

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*Ownership of the ASLRB, YANKS and BV are necessary to play this game.



CRITICAL HIT

CH 9815



POINTE DU HOC

The Invasion of Normandy: June 6 - 8, 1944



INTRODUCTION: The enemy guns known to be positioned on top of the promontory at Pointe du Hoc could fire on both American invasion beaches, Utah and Omaha during D-Day. The 2nd Ranger Battalion, led by Colonel James Rudder, was ordered to scale the 117 foot high cliffs and knock out this battery. The game **POINTE DU HOC** from Critical Hit! depicts this gallant and unusual mission.

Included in the game are five firefights, a campaign game, new game counters, and a VARIANT rules section needed to portray the assault on Pointe du Hoc. All sections of the rules section presented here are assumed to have a prefix of "PdH" before the rule number.

1.0 THE COUNTERS: Critical Hit! provides variant counters in PdH. These counters feature a new design distinct from their ASL predecessors. Rangers and German 5-4-7 SMG squads have Assault Fire (A7.36) and Spraying Fire (A7.36) capabilities which are denoted by the sub-machine-gun depiction on the broken (back) side of the counter. A Smoke Placement Exponent (A24.1) is signified by the 'smoke grenade' icon to the right of the strength factor for each, with the value of the smoke exponent signified by the circled number on the back of the counter.

1.1 U.S. ARMY RANGERS: Ranger squads have a 7³-6-7 strength factor (A1.2).

1.11 Rangers are Commandos (H1.24). Their Broken Morale Level (A1.4) is underlined to denote their ELR of 5 (A19.13).

1.12 Ranger Half squads have a strength factor of 3-4-7. Use U.S. Elite HS (in the ASL counter mix). Their ML is also considered underlined.

1.13 Rangers may voluntarily declare Hand-to-Hand CC (J2.31).

1.14 Ranger squads may Deploy (A1.31) without a Leader as per the rules for Finnish troops (A25.7) (EXC: Rangers must pass a NTC without the +1 DRM). A deployed Ranger squad is replaced by two 3-4-7 HS and a 1-6-8 BAR gunner (1.17).

1.15 Rangers may recombine as per A1.32 with two possible combinations: two Ranger 3-4-7 HS with a BAR gunner recombine to form a 7-6-7 squad; two 3-4-7 HS *without* a BAR gunner recombine to form a normal U.S. 6-6-7 squad (EXC: this 6-6-7 squad is considered a Ranger squad and PdH 1.11-1.14 apply.)

1.16 A Ranger 7-6-7 squad that suffers casualty reduction (A7.302; A11.11; A15.42) must make a subsequent dr: a dr of 1-3 results in a 3-4-7 and a BAR gunner; a dr of 4-6 results in a 3-4-7 HS and a BAR counter. A BAR is the equivalent of an ATR with a ROF of 1 and a range of 6.

1.17 BAR GUNNER: A BAR gunner is treated like a Hero (i.e., wounds, does not break, mark with a Wounded counter if necessary, has 6 MF, does not count for CVP) armed with a 1-6 BAR (EXC: they have no Heroic modifier and will Pin). A BAR counter is left in the hex (EXC: Random SW destruction [A9.74] applies and any MMC/SMC stacked with the BAR gunner may attempt Recovery as per A4.44) in the event the BAR Gunner is eliminated. The BAR Gunner may *not* Transfer his BAR, even if wounded. The BAR malfunctions on a DR of 12 and is eliminated on a repair dr of 6. Any BAR Gunner that possesses a malfunctioned BAR is considered unarmed (A20.5), which is signified by placing a malfunctioned counter. A BAR Gunner is eliminated along with the malfunctioned BAR counter on a repair dr of 6.

1.171 BAR Gunners have 1 IPC, and as such may *not* portage any additional SW, even if unarmed as per 1.16 due to BAR malfunction.

1.172 PRISONER STATUS: Should a Ranger squad become a Prisoner (A.20), no BAR gunner/BAR counter is created.

1.2 GERMAN SMG SQUADS: New German squad counters are introduced in PdH. These squads have a strength factor of 5²-4-7 and represent 1st Line SMG squads.

1.21 German SMG squads deploy (A1.31) to form two 2nd Line 2-3-7 HS. Two 2-3-7 HS *always* recombine (A1.32) into a 4-4-7 second line squad.

1.22 For ELR purposes, the following applies: 5-4-8 → 5-4-7 → 4-4-7 → 4-3-6; 2-3-8 → 2-3-7 → 2-3-6. In PdH a 4-4-7 squad always battle hardens to form a 5-4-7 squad.

1.3 SHORE FIRE CONTROL PARTIES (SFCP): In PdH the two provided SFCP counters are used in lieu of "Chinese, Italian, or Axis Minor 2-2-7 Infantry crew counters". All rules for SFCP (G14.61 and G14.61) apply normally.

2.0 NEW TERRAIN AND FORTIFICATIONS: PdH introduces new on-map terrain features and fortifications along with additional terrain/fortification counters.

2.1 CRATERS: Craters represent large shell holes caused by the pre D-Day Allied bombardment. They are a **great obstacle** to movement and are deep enough to protect infantry from direct fire. (EX: Hex DD8 is a crater hex).

2.11. A crater location is considered to be at level -1, below the level of the rest of the hex. Treat the crater as a one hex gully for LOS. It is *not* a separate location for stacking purposes.

2.12 MOVEMENT FACTORS: Infantry spend one MF to enter a crater. Infantry exit a crater hex by spending the MF cost of entering higher terrain (B10.4).

2.13 CREST STATUS: Infantry may gain Crest status as per B20.9. All rules for Crest apply (EXC: 2.131).

2.131 Infantry exiting the hex through a crest hexside are considered at the base elevation of the hex being exited into. To exit from a non-Crest hexside they must spend one additional MF in the crater hex and are subject to FFMO in that crater hex. These units are only subject to fire while IN the crater hex by units that have a LOS into the crater.

2.14 VEHICLES: Only fully tracked AFVs may enter a crater at a cost of 3 MP and a passing a Bog check. AFVs may exit a crater by paying the cost of the hex entered plus the cost of entering higher terrain *and* passing a Bog check. AFVs failing a bog check exiting/entering a crater are considered to be IN the crater. Exiting AFVs are subject to Underbelly hits (D4.3).

2.141 HULL DOWN: AFVs may make a HD maneuver attempt in a crater as per the rules for F5.42 (EXC: AFVs may only attempt a HD maneuver while either IN that Crater hex, or via an adjacent hex/Crater Bank (2.15.) AFVs exit from a HD position as per F5.422.

2.142 Non fully-tracked vehicles may only enter a crater hex using VBM and are considered on a Crater Bank (PdH 2.15.)

2.15 CRATER BANKS: Units in a Crater hex but not IN a crater are considered on a crater bank. Place them on a crater bank counter to signify this status. Infantry on a crater bank are considered to be in open ground and FFMO and FFNAM apply to moving infantry units. AFVs and non fully-tracked vehicles may only move along a Crater bank by utilizing VBM (D2.3). All VBM rules apply normally.

2.16 TEM/LOS: All units IN a crater receive a +1 TEM that are not in crest status/HD may only be attacked as if in a gully, or by indirect fire.

2.17 CREATION: Craters may be created during play by any HE/OBA/NOBA/bomb attack that is resolved on the 200/36+ column on the IFT on an original DR resulting in a 5 KIA or greater. This result eliminates all other terrain/units/fortifications and a crater counter is placed in that hex. If the hex contains a *multi-level* building, all building levels are reduced to ground level rubble and no crater counter is placed.

2.2 SHINGLE: The beach at Pointe du Hoc consists not of sand, but of shingle. Shingle is beach gravel mixed with pebbles and sand. All rules



for Hammada (F3.31) apply (EXC: Infantry expend 1 1/2 MP to cross a shingle hex.) Shingle has no additional effect on LC and is considered soft sand (G13.3) (EXC: indirect fire is *not* halved.)

2.3 BLOCKHOUSES: Blockhouses (EX: hex H15) are covered barracks located in fortified positions to protect troops from enemy bombardment. All pillbox rules (B30) apply to blockhouses except as modified below. Use the blockhouse boxes on the German CG Card to hold the contents of each blockhouse. Alternately, the corresponding Cloaking display box may be used to hold the contents for either player.

2.31 INHERENT TUNNELS: Blockhouses automatically receive two inherent tunnels (B8.6). A blockhouse may be entered through one of its inherent tunnels, as per B8.6 (note that in PdH a tunnel entrance *may* exist in an open ground hex), or from an ADJACENT trench at a cost of one MF. If a tunnel entrance is in open ground and does not connect to a trench/gun bunker/weapons pit/pillbox and is in the LOS of an enemy unit at the time it is used, it is automatically revealed. This tunnel may be destroyed by any ground unit that ends its MPH in the hex, or during the PFPH at no cost to the unit that destroys the entrance.

2.32 STACKING: A blockhouse is a separate in-hex location and has a stacking capacity of 3 squads/equivalents, 4 SMC and 15 PP.

2.33 A blockhouse has a CA/NCA TEM of +7. All attacks (EXC: CC) are treated as a pillbox being attacked outside its CA. Units inside a blockhouse may not attack in any manner and have no effect on routing units. A set DC attacks the blockhouse and the units therein using 36 FP and no TEM. A KIA result eliminates the blockhouse, all units/SW therein, and any connected tunnels and stone rubble is placed in the hex. Any HE/OBA/NOBA/Bomb attack eliminates a blockhouse on a original DR resulting in a 5KIA and replaces it with shellholes/craters if applicable (i.e., $\geq 150\text{mm}$ causes shellholes; $\geq 200\text{mm}$ causes craters on a 5KIA). Heavy Payloads (C.7) apply to this DR.

2.34 All units in a blockhouse are placed on the blockhouse play aid on the German CG Card. Place a concealment counter from a nationality not in play in the hex to signify non-HIP units are set up within. A blockhouse is Rally terrain. Units exiting a blockhouse are placed under a concealment counter when they exit, unless they are entering an open ground location that does not contain a trench/gun bunker/weapons pit/pillbox not occupied by an enemy unit. Exiting units may Assault Move/Advance directly into an adjacent fortification.

2.35 CLOSE COMBAT: A unit attacking the contents of a blockhouse may attack each MMC as if it was the only unit in the hex. Each MMC in a blockhouse is considered to have a FP of 2 for the purposes of CC odds determination and the defender must identify the entire contents of the blockhouse to the opponent during CC. Leaders/heroes may be stacked with any MMC desired and add one to its CC value. Only one MMC may attack the contents of a blockhouse during the CC phase and only if there are no enemy MMC in the hex outside the blockhouse. Units inside a blockhouse may never attack in CC unless attacked. Units in a blockhouse are not held in melee if they can leave the blockhouse and enter a hex that is not occupied by an enemy unit. Units in a Blockhouse do not hold enemy units in Melee.

2.4 OBSERVATION POST BUNKER (OPB): Unless modified below, all pillbox rules (B30) apply to the OPB. The OPB is located in hex OO13. German units IN the OPB are set up in the OPB box on the German CG Card; units outside the OPB are placed on-map in the hex. Use the OPB box on the German CG Card to hold the contents of Observation Post Bunker. Alternately, the corresponding Cloaking display box may be used to hold the contents for either player.

2.41 The OPB is the equivalent of a 3+5+7 pillbox. No 5/8" counter



Illustration 1

may be set up/moved/assembled in the OPB. The OPB is a level one Obstacle (A6.2). See PdH 2.71 for AXMG.

2.42 The CA of the OPB (see Illustration 1) extends outward from the hex spine OO12/NN13 on the western facing to the Hex row OO on the eastern facing. The rear of the OPB has an 'inherent' stairwell whose sole function is to allow units in the OPB hex to move up-slope at a cost of 1 MF. Units in this stairwell have a TEM of +2. Note that Hex OO13 is downslope from Hexes NN12 and NN13.

2.43 BLIND ZONE: Units IN the OPB have no LOS/LOF to all beach/ocean hexes less than/equal to two hexes from OO13 (see Illustration 1).

(EX: Hexes: OO11, OO12, OO14, OO15, PP11, PP12, PP13, PP14, QQ12, QQ13, and QQ14 are blind hexes from the OPB as are all hexes south of hexrow OO).

2.44 All FP from the OPB is halved (EXC: MG fire is full strength).

2.45 A field phone in the OPB can only be eliminated by a *final* contact DR of 12. For each *new* shellhole/crater counter created in the security area of such a field phone add a +1 DRM to any future contact DR.

2.451 If the field phone is eliminated as per PdH 2.45, it is immediately replaced with a radio. This radio may not be removed from the OPB and may only be used for an onboard OBA module (PdH 2.46). The OPB radio is a normal German radio in every other respect (i.e., contact #8, B #12, etc.) Any field phone/radio in an OPB may be eliminated by an enemy ground unit that possesses it as per A9.73.

2.46 ON-BOARD OBA: The five onboard 155 Artillery guns may be used as an on board OBA module. All guns forfeit their Direct Fire capability when firing in this mode. The minimum range for this fire is 15 hexes. Normal Contact and Battery access rules apply. The German player receives a hit pile of 8B/3R.

2.47 An OPB may be eliminated as per B30.92.

2.48 The OPB automatically has one inherent tunnel.

2.5 WEAPONS PITS: Weapons pits represent open concrete gun emplacements that were used in fortified areas in lieu of gun bunkers or pillboxes. (EX: Hex CC17 is a weapons pit). Additional weapons pit counters are included in the PdH counter mix for purchase in the CG. These rules supersede any previous versions for use in PdH.

2.51 ORIENTING THE WEAPONS PIT COUNTER: A weapons pit counter is oriented with the arrow pointing to a particular hexspine CA (EXC: on-map weapons pits have a CA which corresponds with the opposite side of the depiction from the hexside connected to an on-map trench; e.g. the on-map weapons pit in GG18 has an 'arrow' facing GG17.) The two hexsides within the CA are considered Front hexsides, as are the hexsides adjacent to the CA, forming a contiguous group of 4 hexsides. The 2 remaining hexsides are termed Rear hexsides and are the only hexsides which a vehicle may cross to enter a weapons pit. A weapons pit is a separate location within a hex and may not be placed in a hex that contains any other fortifications (EX: wire, mines) Units



entering a weapons pit from a trench or tunnel are considered connected and are not attacked by any wire or mines.

2.52 If adjacent to a trench counter, infantry may enter a weapons pit as per B27.54. Otherwise, infantry enter/exit a weapons pit as per B27.4. B27.41 and B27.42 also apply.

2.53 **STACKING:** A weapons pit has a stacking capacity of one gun, its crew and one additional squad/equivalent *and* 10 PP. A weapons pit may be located in any terrain that can accommodate a pillbox.

2.54 **VEHICLES:** Vehicles cross/enter a weapons pit as per B27.55 (EXC: Rear hexsides) and must take a Bog check (EXC: Vehicles may enter via a Rear hexside/trench hexside along their VCA only, and are considered HD). A vehicle may not change VCA while within a weapons pit, i.e., to exit, a vehicle must use reverse movement unless it used Reverse Movement to enter.

2.55 **TEM:** A weapons pit has a TEM of +2 vs. direct fire and a +3 TEM vs NOBA/OBA/Overrun.

2.56 **RALLY BONUS:** A weapons pit is Rally terrain.

2.57 **GUNS:** A Gun in a weapons pit may change its covered arc in any direction even if it is restricted by RFNM or NM. Guns that are normally allowed to pivot, have a maximum pivot DRM of +2 for the first hex side (EXC: if they are RFNM or NM the maximum DRM is +3).

2.6 **GUN BUNKERS:** A gun bunker is concrete fortification and is treated as a pillbox except where noted otherwise (EX: Hex JJ11 is a gun bunker.) A gun bunker may be placed in any hex that can accommodate a pillbox. Additional gun bunkers are included in the PdH counter mix. Gun bunkers purchased for the CG may only be set up in hexes containing on-map weapons pits, to 'improve' them to become gun bunkers. All pillbox rules (B30.) apply to gun bunkers except as modified below. Use the gun bunker boxes on the German CG Card to hold the contents of each gun bunker. Alternately, the corresponding Cloaking display box may be used to hold the contents for either player.

2.61 **STACKING:** A gun bunker may contain 1 squad/equivalent, 1 HS/crew, 4 SMC, 1 ordnance counter and 5 PP in its main compartment and up to 5PP of SW in each of its AXMG. In addition, each AXMG position may contain 1 HS/crew, 1 SMC and 3PP. The stacking capacity of each component of a gun bunker may *not* be exceeded at any time.

2.62 **LOS/LOF:** A Gun bunker is a one level LOS/LOF obstruction and is considered to have a Rooftop Location. A Gun bunker is a separate location from the rest of the hex. Units in a gun bunker or AXMG are never required to rout if broken but will surrender in the CCPh if an enemy unit enters the hex containing the gun bunker.

2.63 Only ordnance, one SW and 1S equivalent may fire from the main compartment through the CA.

2.64 **COVERED ARC (CA):** CA is determined in the same manner as a Gun. (EXC: Bypassing units along the hex sides at the edge of the CA are considered to be within the CA.) The CA of a gun bunker has a +3

TEM. Ordnance firing on the TH table fire on the contents of a gun bunker with a +3 DRM. An original TH DR of ≤ 4 is treated as a Critical Hit. A CH through the covered arc of a gun bunker eliminates the ordnance in the main compartment as per C3.71. Use C3.74 to resolve the fire against all other units in the main compartment.

2.65 The gun bunker's NCA modifier is +8.

B30.35 will apply only if the basic TK# is \geq three times the NCA modifier.



2.66 Gun bunkers are a level one Obstacle (A6.2).

2.7 **AUXILIARY MACHINE GUN FIRING PORTS (AXMG):** AXMG represent firing "slits" or "ports" that were large enough to house a




Illustration 2

MG but narrow enough to afford protection for the crew. These MG's were placed for protection from close assault.

2.71 Any AXMG purchased for the OPB must have a CA facing both NN12/NN13.

2.72 Each AXMG has its CA determined by SR or player's choice if purchased for a CG firefight. Before any set up, the AXMG CA points at a specific hex vertex (see illustration 2). The CA of the AXMG may overlap that of the gun bunker. The existence and CA of an AXMG is not revealed a unit within fires *or* a Good Order enemy infantry unit enters the AXMG CA within 6 hexes and the LOS of the gun bunker. **Once the existence of a AXMG is revealed, place an MG CA (provided in ASL) counter pointing along a hexspine from a hex two hexes away (i.e., a MG CA counter for an AXMG in the southeast corner of the gun bunker in JJ11 is placed in II13) defining the CA.** An enemy ground unit in the same hex as a gun bunker reveals all AXMG. Units in an AXMG are placed on board unconcealed only if they fire when an enemy ground unit is in the same or adjacent hex *and* in the CA of the AXMG. Use the AXMG Play Aid to record the existence and location of AXMG, and to place units off board that are inside AXMG. Note the compass rose on the OPB play aid is used to determine the on-map reference point for each AXMG also.

2.73 The AXMG has a CA DRM of +5 and a NCA DRM of +7. Small arms fire directed against the CA of a AXMG affects only the infantry units in the AXMG whose CA the fire enters. Units in the main compartment are affected only if its CA is also within LOS/LOF. The NCA DRM for the gun bunker is reduced by one for each AXMG CA that the incoming fire crosses. Ordnance fire directed at a gun bunker that also contains AXMG uses one TH DR to resolve the attack and adds the applicable DRM for TH determination. Any hit against the main compartment also affect the contents of *all* AXMG as Area Fire with a +3 DRM on the effects DR. A FT attack vs. an AXMG is also resolved as Area Fire vs. all other occupants of the gun bunker. Any MG in an AXMG may be used in CC at half strength [FRD] on the CC table. Each AXMG is considered to be a separate location from the rest of the gun bunker and a unit may move from an AXMG to any other AXMG or leave the gun bunker at a cost of 1 MF. All attacks against a gun bunker that affect units in the main compartment and in any AXMG are resolved using one DR and the appropriate DRM and Area Fire if required.

2.74 A Critical Hit against the occupants of a gun bunker's main compartment is treated as a normal hit vs. all occupants of the AXMG and is resolved using the same effects DR.

2.75 OBA attacks vs. a gun bunker use the NCA DRM of +7 to resolve *all* attacks regardless of direction and the presence of any AXMG. NOBA fire that enters the hex though the main compartment CA uses a DRM of +5 against the main compartment and a +7 against all AXMG.

2.76 A gun bunker is destroyed by any hit on the main compartment by any HE/OBA/NOBA/Bomb attack that results in a K/KIA *after* the covered arc DRM that applied to the TH DR of the attack is applied to the final DR (including the modifiers applied in the event of a Critical



Hit). A HE critical hit vs. an AXMG eliminates the AXMG and its contents and is resolved as a normal hit vs. the rest of the gun bunker. A destroyed gun bunker is replaced by stone rubble and all other ground units/fortifications/terrain in the hex are eliminated.

2.8 ARMORED SHIELDS: A gun bunker may be equipped with a steel shield over the main compartment CA by SR or CG purchase. An armored shield makes the gun bunker immune to small arms fire (EX: AXMG covered arcs). A FT attacks an armored shield as if attacking a pillbox CA. Ordnance may attack an armored shield by making a TH attempt vs. an infantry target with no DRM for the gun bunker using the size DRM for the gun in the main compartment. A hit allows a TK attempt vs. the AF of the armored shield. A final DR \leq armor factor allows an IFT DR vs. the contents of the gun bunker as if it was a hit vs. a gun bunker without an armored shield and removes the shield permanently (i.e., no new armored shield may be purchased). A final DR \leq 1/2 the final TK [FRD] DR needed results in a CH vs. the contents of the main compartment with a DRM of -4 and a normal hit vs. the contents of any AXMG. The DRM for NOBA fire vs. the CA of a gun bunker equipped with an armored shield is +7 and increased by one for every 8 AF (FRU) purchased on the Replacement FP Table until a maximum of +9 is reached. A DC attack vs. an armored shield allows a DR on the placement table with the results as follows:

≤ 5	30 FP no DRM
6-8	30 FP +1/2 NOBA covered arc DRM FRU
9-11	30 FP + NOBA covered arc DRM
12	12 FP + NOBA covered arc DRM

2.81 A set DC explodes against the armored shield at 36 FP with no DRM. A DC cannot eliminate a gun bunker.

2.82 The gun in the main compartment cannot fire Within Hex (A7.212 & A7.21 & C5.5).

2.9 CLIFF RUBBLE: Any HE attack against a level two cliff hexside resulting in an original KIA places a cliff rubble counter at the base level of an adjacent beach hexside in a similar manner to B24.12, with the following changes: if more than one hex is adjacent, determine the hex randomly, but re-roll for any non-beach hexside. (EX: A NOBA attack on Hex NN14 results in a 1 KIA. Make a dr; a dr of 1-2 places a cliff rubble counter on Hex OO14; 3-4 places a cliff rubble counter in Hex OO15; and a dr of 5-6 places a cliff rubble on Hex NN15. Cliff rubble is not Inherent terrain (B.6). LOS traced along a Cliff Rubble hexside is considered to cross a crest line.

2.91 Units in a base level hex affected by placement of a cliff rubble hexside must take an immediate 2 MC. All unpossessed SW/un-armored vehicles (CS is allowed) are eliminated in such hexes. Semi/half-tracked vehicles are immobilized. Fully-tracked vehicles are Bogged. Beached water-craft (i.e., LC) are not affected in any manner. Surviving units are considered in a ground level location in the hex and *not* at level one on the Cliff Rubble. Surviving units may exit the hex without climbing on top of the Cliff Rubble but must pay 3 MF if they wish to move to level one in the hex.

2.92 Cliff rubble elevates the base level of its present hex one level. (EX: A unit on top of a cliff rubble counter on Hex MM17 is considered to be at level one.)

2.93 Infantry spend 3 MP to enter a cliff rubble hex. cliff rubble has a TEM of +1 (even if a unit is 'under' the Cliff Rubble) and negates FFMO.

2.010 WATER TOWER: A water tower is located at the hex vertex of hexes P21, O21, and O22. Typical of water towers in Normandy, this tower is made of stone and is a level two obstacle. All fire traced through this hexspine junction ends at the adjacent hex (see illustration #3).




Illustration 3

Units changing levels on this staircase are subject to FFNAM/FFMO and any unit broken while ascending/descending are subject to a Falling DR as per B11.41 (EXC: ignore the reference to the inability of broken units to climb and on a Final DR of \geq 10 the unit is eliminated) in order to return to ground level without being eliminated. Acquisition counters are placed right on the water tower depiction if firing at a unit on the Rooftop location.

2.011 PERIMETER WIRE: All wire depicted on-map is considered perimeter wire. (EX: Hex HH3). This wire is not as effective as regular Wire (B.26), therefore all rules for Barbed Wire fences (P.3) apply (EXC: OPT. Rule). Any wire depiction in a cliff hexside is not considered perimeter wire; this depiction *only* signifies hexsides the German may place Set DC in as per CG SR #10.

2.0111 OPT PERIMETER WIRE RULE: Players may simply use the following rule. Infantry pay IMF + COT to cross perimeter wire. The use of Armored Assault negates this penalty and this cost is doubled at night. Perimeter wire has no effect on MP costs but any vehicle crossing such a hexside must first pass a Bog Check, with all non fully tracked vehicles paying a +1 DRM.

2.012 KNOWN MINEFIELDS: Known minefields (F.7) are printed on the PdH map (EX: hex S11). Known minefields are AP only, and have a strength factor of two (i.e., this is an exception to B28.1).

2.013 THE JIB: The knife-like terrain feature that juts out toward the sea along the hex junction of hexes PP12-PP13-QQ13 is a level one cliff obstacle. No unit may climb/set up/enter/cross the hexside of this terrain depiction.

3.0 ADVANCED CLIMBING RULES. The Rangers were specially equipped and trained to climb the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc using toggle ropes, grappling lines, rope ladders and specially equipped landing craft. All climbing rules (B11.4) apply with the following exceptions and additions.

3.1 FREE CLIMBING: Units that attempt to climb without using Rope counters (PdH 3.2), tubular scaling ladders (PdH 3.5), and DUKW extension ladders (PdH 3.6) use the B11.4 rules normally.

3.2 ROPE COUNTERS: Rope Counters (hereafter referred to as RC) represent rope ladders, "toggle" ropes, and grappling lines fired up the cliffs at Pointe du Hoc by a mortar line being mounted on a LC or carried by hand to the bottom of the cliffs. These were fired via Portable Launchers (PdH 3.3) or by specially mounted Rope Launchers mounted on LCAs (PdH 3.4). RCs may support up to 3S for stacking purposes.

3.21 Units that attempt to climb via a RC must first utilize B11.41. If successful, these units may then attempt to gain an additional level (B11.43 does *not* apply) by passing an additional climbing DR (Falling DR: B11.41 can apply). A DR less than or equal to 7 allows that unit to ascend the extra level. Leadership modifiers apply. (EX: A unit on OO15 is attempting to climb via a RC. The DR is an 8, and that unit is placed on top of a 1st level Climb counter. This unit *then* rolls an additional



DR of 6, and is now placed on top of a 2nd Level Climb counter. This unit then advances to Hex NN14 during the APh.)

3.3 PORTABLE LAUNCHERS: Each LCA in PdH is assumed to contain two portable launchers (referred hereafter as PL) that may be removed by any infantry unit. Each PL costs 2PP to portage. A PL may only be fired, or 'used' once.

3.31 A PL is successfully fired at an adjacent Cliff hexside on a DR of ≤ 7 . If successfully fired, place a 1S RC across the adjacent cliff hexside. If adjacent to two cliff hexsides (EX: from beach hex OO12 to NN12/OO13), the firing unit may place a RC across either hexside (player's choice). Each subsequent PL that successfully places a *new* RC may choose the other accessible cliff hexside with a 1S RC or increase the existing RC to a 2S or 3S capacity.

3.32 An unsuccessful DR eliminates one 'level' of the PL. Flip the counter over to its 1S RC side. This RC has 1PP and may be placed across a 2nd Level cliff hexside as per PdH 3.31.

3.33 Friendly units on a second level cliff hexside may place a RC across the cliff hexside, down to adjacent beach hexes. Each unit attempting to place a RC must pass a NTC. Once successful, place a RC along any cliff hexside in this manner.

3.34 Enemy units on a second level cliff hexside may attempt to remove a RC by expending two MF *and* passing a NTC. These units are subject to Hazardous Movement (A4.62) penalties. A successful removal attempt eliminates the RC and any climbing units using the RC are immediately eliminated.

3.4 LCA MOUNTED LAUNCHERS: Each LCA is equipped with six Rope Launchers. These Rope Launchers may *not* be removed from the LCA at any time. To place an RC from an LCA, the LCA must be Beached (G13.442). The LCA may make three attempts per turn to fire their PL in the same manner as PdH 3.30-31. For every successful attempt, place a 1S RC across the adjacent cliff hexside (EX: A beached LCA on hex OO12 is attempting to fire its RL across cliff hex NN12 and/or OO13. The DR is a 6, and a 1S RC is placed across NN12. It then rolls a subsequent 4, and the owning player may choose to either increase the 1S RC on NN12 to 2S, *or* place a 1S RC across hex OO13. It then rolls another 6, and may now increase the RC on NN12 to 3S, *or* increase the 1S RC in OO13 to a 2S RC.)

3.5 TUBULAR SCALING LADDERS: In addition to the mounted rope launchers, each LCA carried tubular scaling ladders (hereafter referred to as TSL) in 4 foot sections. Once assembled, these ladders reached a height of 112 feet; enough to enable the Rangers to surmount the cliffs. Special 5/8" counters and the following rules are used to portray this use.

3.51 Each LCA contains an inherent 5/8" TSL counter which may reach as high as two levels. Each TSL costs 2 PP to portage and are at either level one (gray side) or level two (yellow side). In order to assemble a level one TSL, two MMC in the hex must *each* pass a NTC. A third NTC (i.e., by another MMC in the same hex and during the same turn, or the same, *or* a different MMC during a different turn) is needed to assemble a level two TSL. Leadership modifiers apply. Any MMC(s) which attempts a TSL TC become TI. Place a level one or two TSL counter under the units taking the TSL TC to signify the height assembled (i.e., either level one or two) and place part of the TSL counter across the adjacent cliff hexside. Units on top of a cliff rubble hexside (10.) need only a one level TSL counter to reach the top of the cliffs (i.e., level two) and after passing two NTC may place a level one TSL across any adjacent cliff hexside (EX: Two HS are on a cliff rubble hexside with a TSL counter in hex MM16; one HS rolls a 7 NTC. A

one level TSL counter may be placed across cliff hexside MM15, or across either LL15 or LL16. If the second HS rolls a 7, a two level TSL may be placed instead). Labor counters may be placed to remind players that one TSL TC has been passed.

3.52 Units may climb a TSL one level per 3MF expended. No falling DR is necessary. Units climbing TSL are using Hazardous Movement (A4.62). Normal portage costs apply when climbing a TSL but units may not exceed their IPC (EXC: if accompanied by a Leader as per A4.42).

3.53 Enemy units may attempt to destroy already placed TSL as per PdH 3.34.

3.6 DUKW EXTENSION LADDERS: To further facilitate the cliff climbing at PdH, four DUKWs were specially equipped with extension ladders donated by the London Fire Department. Counters are provided in PdH for these special DUKWs. These are treated as regular DUKWs with the following changes.

3.61 Each such DUKW has an inherent 2 level extension ladder (hereafter referred to as EL) that was built into each DUKW. Due to the size of the EL, each DUKW so equipped has a reduced 10PP capacity.

3.62 Once a DUKW is adjacent to a cliff hexside, the vehicle may raise the ladder by expending half (FRD) of the DUKW's MP, and making an EL DR. A DR ≤ 7 enables the vehicle to place a one level ladder across any adjacent cliff hexside. To place a level two ladder counter the vehicle must expend its entire MP allotment and make an EL DR. To retract a raised EL, the DUKW must expend either half (FRD) of its MP to lower the ladder one level, or expend all of its MP to completely retract a two level EL. An extension DR is made for each level retracted. A DUKW with its inherent EL retracted may then move normally. Once a DUKW has raised its EL, signify this status by placing the back side of the DUKW up, with either a normal level one or level two counter under it. An additional, normal DUKW (provided in the ASL counter set) is then placed in the DUKW's hex.

3.63 MALFUNCTION: A DR of ≥ 8 will cause an EL to malfunction. A malfunctioned EL may be repaired on a dr of "1", and disables on a repair dr of ≥ 4 . There is a +1 DRM modifier to any malfunction DR for *each* +1 Stun counter placed on the DUKW.

3.634 RECALL: Any DUKW with a disabled EL is automatically Recalled once all Passengers have unloaded. A DUKW with a level one or two EL successfully raised/retracted is Retained and may remain on board in its hex during subsequent CG firefights until the EL is retracted or disabled.

3.65 INFANTRY USE: Infantry may scale an EL as per PdH 3.52 Note that units that move into, or begin their MPH in the DUKW hex do not pay additional MF to load into the DUKW. Passengers may only begin their climb after either step of PdH 3.62 has been completed. Any scaling units are eliminated if the DUKW is eliminated (i.e., CS is NA for scaling units.)

3.66 MACHINE GUNS: Each DUKW has two Lewis LMG mounted at the top of the EL (where the fire hose originally was placed) are represented by the 2 x 2 factor AAMG on the DUKW counters. Any squad/ Hero scaling the EL may fire *both* of these LMGs while forfeiting its inherent FP. A HS may fire only one LMG. These LMGs may be voluntarily removed as per KGP CG.9 or via Scrounging and have no ROF.

4.0 ON BOARD NAVAL DIRECT FIRE: The existing NOBA rules were primarily designed to portray the heavy firepower provided by battleships and cruisers off shore supporting amphibious landings. What was *not* included are rules governing the supporting fire delivered by



the patrolling destroyers that ventured close to the shoreline. More often than not, destroyers risked running aground in order to provide the attackers direct fire-support, often engaging enemy fortifications, guns, AFVs and infantry concentrations. All NOBA rules (G14.6) apply normally with the following modifications.

4.1 PdH introduces a generic destroyer counter to the counter mix. The destroyers that supported the assault at Pointe du Hoc were the USS Satterlee, USS Thompson, USS Barton, and the HMS Talybont, and are represented by a generic destroyer counter in PdH. Any of these vessels may utilize On Board Naval Direct Fire (hereafter referred to as OBNDF).

4.11 OBNDF may be utilized during any CG firefight or by SR.

4.12 Included in PdH is a Destroyer Reference Chart (DRC) which lists the number of guns each ship may fire per turn (EX: The USS Satterlee and USS Thompson have four single turrets which house one 105L gun per turret). Each turret may fire on different targets. In addition, each destroyer has an IFE which represents on board AA guns that may also fire at on board targets in addition to the Gun turrets MA.

4.13 Each OBNDF gun uses the C3 TH Table with the following exceptions: Case 1 of C5 (BU/CE) status *never* applies; ROF is NA to all OBNDF; Intensive Fire is NA; Turreted MA may fire in the AFPh as per C5.35; and a destroyer may not use Case N unless anchored.

4.14 MULTIPLE HITS: Any dual turret gun that achieves a hit qualifies for Multiple Hits as per C3.8.

4.15 AP AMMO: Destroyer guns may opt to fire at Pillboxes/OPB/gun bunkers using AP ammo as per B30.35. The HE equivalent (C8.31) of destroyer AP ammo is 4.

4.161 MOVEMENT: Each destroyer has 15 MP and spends one MP per on-map water hex. An on-map destroyer has a special CA, defined by a hexside. A destroyer moving on-map cannot change its CA (see PdH 4.165.) at any time. A destroyer is either moving or anchored, which is signified by either having the counter front or back displayed. No more than one destroyer may be on-map at any time. A destroyer may enter from off map on either the east or west edge of the ocean overlays placed as per CG SR #2.

4.162 An anchored destroyer is treated as non moving target. D2.12 applies to an anchored destroyer (EXC: It requires three MP to start).

4.163 D2.13 applies to a destroyer (EXC: It requires three MP to stop). A Stopped destroyer is considered anchored.

4.164 A moving destroyer is subject to Drift (G13.444).

4.165 A destroyer may only enter another hex that lies within the counter's CA. In order to change CA, the destroyer must first exit the playing area. The destroyer may re-enter the playing area two MP's later along its new CA from the same edge (i.e., east or west) it exited from. While off board, destroyers utilize normal NOBA rules. No destroyer may move within 12 hexes of *any* land/beach hex. (EX: The U.S. player may have one destroyer onboard using OBNDF and another using NOBA from off board during the same CG firefight.)

4.166 A destroyer may move in the MP's *after* firing in the PFPh at a cost of half (FRU) of its MF, plus the additional three MP's to start. It may not fire again in the subsequent AFPh.

4.17 In order to fire an OBNDF mission, the target must lie within the destroyer's side CA and be within LOS of the destroyer's ship-board observer, at level one in the destroyer's hex as listed on the DRC.

4.171 Each Destroyer has an IFE attack that represents its light AA guns used in direct fire. The IFE strength of each destroyer is listed in the U.S. CG Card notes and in the DRC. Determine LOS in the same

manner as a ship board observer. Destroyer IFE has a normal range of 16 hexes and is halved for fire at ranges greater than 16 hexes. The IFE attack has a ROF of 2. If used against an armored target, it must first make a TH DR. Once a hit has been achieved, make two TK DR, if the base IFE is ≤ 12 , and four TK DR if the IFE is > 12 . For TH and TK purposes, treat these guns as a 40L and use red TH numbers. The ship's movement does not affect this fire.

4.172 COUNTERBATTERY FIRE: On board ordnance may attack an off-board ship using a NOBA module only if the gun size of the ordnance firing is greater than or equal to the gun size of the NOBA module. For determining this, use the IFE table. Guns using the same IFE column to resolve an HE hit are considered to be the same size. If the firing gun is an LL gun then its IFE table is increased by one; if it is an L gun there is no column shift; if the gun has no length modifier the column is reduced by one; if the gun is a * gun than it suffers a two column shift. This column shift is only used to determine the ability of an on board gun to attack a NOBA module and has no further affect on its fire. A gun firing at an off board ship has a base TH of 6 and the only modifiers are for the firing guns length. A hit is resolved per 4.19.

4.1721 Any NOBA attacked by on board ordnance automatically receives Battery Access and places a FFE:1 counter on that firing gun's location. There is a -1 drm to the accuracy dr. A NOBA FFE:1 may also be placed on the firing unit from another available ship. This other ship may not have in play or attempt to place a FFE:1 on any other location and Battery Access is required as per G14.63.

4.18 An on board destroyer may only be affected by Ordnance and OBA. Destroyers are considered to be an extra large target with a target size modifier of +5 and a destroyer is always considered moving unless anchored.

4.19 ORDNANCE: Once a hit is achieved against a destroyer, a damage DR is made. If hit by HE/HEAT, the DR is subtracted from the basic TK# vs. an armored target and the result is the amount of DP the destroyer suffers. For AP ammo the DR is doubled and subtracted from the basic TK DR, and the result is the number of damage points suffered. For every 10 DP that a Destroyer receives, it must make a MC with a DRM = to each multiple of 10 DP the ship has suffered thus far, with a base ML 8. There is a +1 DRM for every 10 DP that the ship has already suffered. Failure of this MC subjects the destroyer to the effects of Recall and it must exit the board. It may then remain in play, but only as an off board NOBA battery. When a ship has suffered DP equal or greater to 1/2 its total DP, its OBNDF attack is halved and it may no longer use its IFE. When the total DP suffered is greater than the ships allowance, the ship is considered sunk and removed from play.

4.191 CRITICAL HITS: A CH doubles the number of DP received and a subsequent dr is also made.

4.192 CASUALTY VICTORY POINTS: Sunk destroyers earn the opponent CVPs equal to one quarter (FRD) of the ship's initial DP allotment (G12.601).

4.193 OBA FIRE VS. A DESTROYER: When a destroyer is attacked by an OBA FFE or enters an FFE Blast Area, an effects DR is made for every FFE Blast Area hex entered. A KIA results in a hit and a damage DR is made using the HE TK number for the base size of the battery firing. This rule also applies for mortar attacks. Mortars attack the destroyer using the base Area TH number with no modifiers for ship size or movement.

5.0 U.S. MLR: The U.S. MLR is the north edge. If the U.S. MLR includes any hex of the 6/7 PM (Red) Entry Area (hex M30) by the RePh of the 6/7/44PM CG firefight, the U.S. FBE includes M30-JJ29.



POINTE DU HOC

GERMAN CG OBJECTIVES: The Germans win at the end of any CG Firefight if there are no American MMC within the Fortified Zone (see CG SR #11) and the Germans Control all gun bunker/weapons pit Locations.

AMERICAN CG OBJECTIVES: The Americans win at the end of the CG if they can trace a continuous path of road hexes from N29 to the Fortified Zone within their Friendly MLR and they Control all weapons pit/gun bunker Locations and they have captured/eliminated all of the German 155* ART pieces.

Any CG result that does not meet either the German or American CG Objectives is considered a Tactical Draw.

SPECIAL RULES: All PdH CG SR are in effect.

CG DATES: 6/6 AM to 6/8 AM (seven CG Firefights)

CG DRM:	German	American
Leader	-1/+1/+3 (CG Card note "2")	-1
Battle Hardening	0	-1
OBA Ammo	0	+1
CP Replenishment	+2	-4
Intensity Level	High	High

ALL FIREFIGHTS: German sets up first; American moves first.

INITIAL FIREFIGHT OBJECTIVES: The Americans must Control *all* bunker/weapons pit Locations at the end of the Initial Firefight. Any other result is a German victory.

CG FIREFIGHT 2 OBJECTIVES: The Americans win the 6/6/44 PM CG firefight if ≥ 10 hexes of the D514 (the paved road running from U1 - N29) are within the American MLR at the end of the CG firefight.

REPLACEMENT FORTIFICATION POINTS (FP) TABLE:

Type	German	U.S.	Notes
Foxhole	3/2/1	3/2/1	L, F, S
Trench	7	NA	A
Mines	1/3	NA	O, T
THP	3/2/1	3/2/1	F, I, U
Cloaking	5	5	N
Wire	15	NA	A
Pill Box	(a+b+c) x3	NA	A
Road Block	12	15	I
Set DC	15	NA	A
Weapons Pit	30	NA	A
Gun Bunker	42	NA	A, B
Armored Shield	2 per AF	NA	A
Auxiliary MG Firing Ports	10	NA	A

Notes:

A. Available for the Initial Firefight only. See PdH 2.8 for Armored Shields.

B. May only be built on existing weapons pits (EX: On-map weapons pits may be 'upgraded' to gun bunkers, i.e., new weapons pits cannot be purchased, then upgraded to become gun bunkers at any time.)

F. May be set up in a Front Line position.

I. May be set up in an Isolated position.

N. Night firefight only.

O. Must set up ≥ 2 hexes from any Entry Area hex.

S. Foxholes cost 1 FP for each squad capacity

T. Mines cost 1 FP per AP mine factor and 3 FP per AT mine factor.

U. 1 FP per SMC; 2 FP per IIS; and 3 FP per squad.

TERRAIN CONFIGURATION:

The entire Pointe du Hoc map and Ocean Overlays are in play.

Note: All half-hexes are in play for all firefights.



Friendly Board Edges (FBE):

⊕ German FBE is the south edge and the east edge on/south of O30 and the west edge on/south of V0.

◆ American FBE is the north edge. (see PdH 5.0 for 6/7/44 PM)

INITIAL GERMAN OB: [ELR: 3] {SAN: 5}

Elements of the 726th Infantry Regiment set up first in any hinterland hex (See CGSRs: #11 and #12):

155* ART x5 (see CG SR #11) 2-2-8 x 7

RG: A2 RG: 14 x 2 60FP

40CP DC x6 (See CGSR #10)



INITIAL AMERICAN OB: [ELR: 5] {SAN: 5/3 see CGSR #17}

Elements of Companies D, E, and F of the 2nd Ranger Battalion enter via Scabornie Assault (G14.) on either/or the east edge, north of Overlay hex: 1091 or the west edge, north of overlay hex 3079 and/or along the north edge of the Ocean overlays (See CGSR #2).

10-3 10-2 (British) LCA x10

4 x DUKW with EL (see PdH 3.6) RG: 110

82 CP Naval Bombardment (see CGSR #15)

RG: 04 (see CG SR #13) 350 NOBA (see CGSR #7)

Enter two turns after the U.S. entry, using Seabornie Assault (G14.) on either/or the east edge, north of overlay hex 1091 or the west edge, north of overlay hex 3079 and/or along the north edge of the Ocean overlays (See CGSR #2):

2 x Ammo LCA (see CGSR #8). 2 x 2-2-7

2 x dm 81* MTR



Turn Record Track:

1	2 ¹	3 ³	4 ⁵	5 ⁶	6	7	8 ⁶
9	10	11	12	13 ¹	14 ³	15 ⁵	16 ⁶

HISTORICAL WEATHER/CONDITIONS TABLE:

Firefight	Time/date	Weather	EC	Wind	Moon	U.S. CP Bonus	German CP Bonus
1	6/6/44 AM	Overcast	Moist	Hvy. from NW	NA	-	-
2	6/6/44 PM*	CLEAR	Moist	F11.5	NA	-10	+10
3	6/6/44 Night	Part cloudy	Moist	F11.5	Full	-15	+15
4	6/7/44 AM	CLEAR	Moist	F11.5	NA	-	-15
5	6/7/44 PM	CLEAR	Moist	F11.5	NA	-85	+30
6	6/7/44 Night	CLEAR	Moist	F11.5	Full	-15	-15
7	6/8/44 AM	CLEAR	Moist	F11.5	NA	+10	-10

* CP Bonus is added to the CP total for that day for each side.

PRAISE THE LORD

PdH #1

⚔ GERMAN Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
◆ AMERICAN Moves First			END							

Elements of the 726th Infantry Regiment set up in Hinterland hexes, using HIP if desired (see SR 4):

[ELR: 3]
{SAN: 5}

(see CGSR 10)

Companies D, E, and F, 2nd Ranger Battalion enter on turn one along the north edge of Overlay(s) Oc1/Oc2/Oc3:

[ELR: 5]
{SAN: 2}

350mm NOBA (see SR 5)


Elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion enter on turn three along the north edge of Overlay(s) Oc1/Oc2/Oc3:

120mm NOBA (see SR 6)

HANDICAPS:

- ⚔ Replace the German 8-1 leader with a 9-2.
- ◆ The American 120mm NOBA is available on turn three.
- ◆ Any mutually agreed upon alteration to either side's OB.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows north of V are playable)

OBJECTIVES: The Americans win if they Control all gun bunkers and weapons pits at game end.

SPECIAL RULES:

1. EC are Moderate, with no wind at start. The Americans are conducting a Seaborne Assault (G14.1).
2. Place Ocean Overlays as per CG SR #2. Beach Slope is Steep. *Surf is Heavy*. Game length is twelve turns. The 10-2 leader in the initial American OB is British.
3. After all set up, the Americans may conduct a special bombardment. The American places an AR on any hex and determines accuracy and extent of error as if it were Pre-Registered (C1.732). All hexes within four hexes (there are no spared hexes) of this AR are subject to a Bombardment (C1.8).
4. All German units must set up in buildings or fortifications. German units may use HIP even if set up in non-concealment terrain; however, such units are placed on board unconcealed when an enemy ground unit has a LOS to its Location.
5. After German set up and before the American set up, the Americans must select three hexes (one target hex per game turn for each of the first three game turns) to be attacked by 350mm NOBA directed by a Shipboard Observer at Level 3. At the beginning of each American PPh, place an FFE:1 in each designated hex (no Battery Access is required) and roll for accuracy normally. During the German DFPh, the FFE:2 must be corrected back to the pre-designated hex for that game turn. After turn three, these NOBA batteries are no longer available.
6. Beginning on turn four, the Americans receive one module of 120mm NOBA directed by a Shipboard Observer at level one or by the SFCP once it has landed.

POINTE DU HOC, FRANCE, 6 June 1944: The attack on Pointe du Hoc ran into problems before the Rangers reached shore. The guide boat—the motor launch *Fairmile*—headed toward the wrong point—Pointe de la Pêree. Lieutenant Colonel Rudder, spotting the problem, got the assault headed in the right direction. But precious minutes had been lost. Two boats swamped—one carrying valuable ammunition supplies. Fire from Germans on the cliffs claimed several lives. One casualty was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Trevor of the British Commandos, who, despite a bullet wound to the head, cursed the Germans loudly and continued to encourage the climbing Rangers. Meanwhile, not one of the extension-ladder-equipped DUKWs negotiated the beach. Undeterred, Sergeant Stivison climbed the ladder of one DUKW and fired the Lewis machine-gun while perched on top. While the unstable extension ladder swayed precariously, Stivison directed fire at the enemy at the cliff's edge. Heroic actions like these and close-in support from the destroyer *Satterlee* eventually allowed Rudder to send the signal "Praise the Lord," to signify that all the Rangers were up the cliff.



ROAD WARRIORS

PdH #2

GERMAN Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
AMERICAN Moves First							

Elements of the 726th Infantry Regiment set up on/south-of hexrow DD:

1 5-4-7 1	1 4-3-6	8-1	8-0	7-0	FP: 5 Rng: 12 ROF: 2	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1	Cact: 8	7 morale
3	3				2			12

[ELR: 3]
{SAN: 5}

75mm OBA

Elements of Companies D, E, and F, 2nd Ranger Battalion enter on turn one ≤ 3 hexes from hex II12:

7-6-7 1	9-1	8-0	FP: 8 Rng: 60 mm	BAZ 44	2-2-7
5					(see SR 4)

[ELR: 5]
{SAN: 4}

Reinforcements enter on turn four along the north edge:

7-6-7 1	8-1	FP: 8 Rng: 60 mm
3		

120mm NOBA

HANDICAPS:

- The American reinforcements enter on turn three.
- Replace the German 8-1 leader with a 9-2.
- Any mutually agreed upon alteration of either side's OB.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexes numbered ≥ 6 and ≤ 21 in hexrows N-II are in play.)

OBJECTIVES: The Germans win if there are no Good Order American MMC south of the paved road (T6-Q21) at game end.

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with no wind at start.
- The Germans may use HIP for two squad-equivalents (and all SMC/SW stacked with them). The Germans may deploy up to three squads.
- The Germans receive one module of 75mm OBA (HE and Smoke) with Scarce Ammunition.
- The Americans receive one module of 120mm NOBA directed by a SFCP.
- All American MMC/SMC are Fanatic (EXC: SFCP).

POINTE DU HOC, FRANCE, 6 June 1944: While enemy resistance was being cleaned up along the cliff-tops, elements of D, E, and F Companies pushed on toward the D514 highway. Upon reaching the hamlet of Le Guay, German machine-gunners opened up on the advancing Rangers. This resistance was soon despatched, and the Americans reached the junction of an unpaved lane and the black-topped highway. Another machine-gun nest soon opened up, provoking Lieutenant Hill to leap up, shouting, "you couldn't hit a bull in the ass with a bass fiddle." Before the Germans could swing their gun around toward the taunting Ranger, Lieutenant Anderson hurled a grenade into the enemy position. The Rangers soon set up their roadblock and waited for the inevitable enemy counterattack.

[Note: Today, the exit to the highway, hex Q19 on our game map, is named "Ranger Road" in honor of the actions of the men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.]



NOWHERE TO RUN, NOWHERE TO HIDE PdH #3

# GERMAN Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
# GERMAN Moves First								

RANGERS

Elements of Companies D, E, and F, 2nd Ranger Battalion set up ≤ 10 hexes from hex KK13 [EXC: OO13, GG5 and HH4]:

7-6-7	3-4-7	3-3-7	10-3	9-2	8-1	8-0	MA: 60° Rng: 3-45 ROF: 3 MTR	BAZ 44 FP: 8 Rng: 5
12	3	3	(Wounded)	2		3		

[ELR: 5]
{SAN: 3}

Advanced elements of Companies D, E, and F, 2nd Ranger Battalion set up ≤ 4 hexes from hex T10:

7-6-7	3-4-7	9-1	8-0	MA: 60° Rng: 3-45 ROF: 3 MTR	BAZ 44 FP: 8 Rng: 5
6					

Set up with either or both groups:

SFCP 2-2-7	BAR 1-6	DC FP: 30 Rng: 1	? 7 morale
(see SR 3)		2	12

120mm NOBA

726th Infantry Regiment

Elements of the 726th Infantry Regiment set up ≤ 3 hexes from hex GG2:

5-4-7	4-4-7	4-3-6	2-2-8	8-1	7-0	FP: 5 Rng: 12 ROF: 2 MMG	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1 LMG	MA: 50° Rng: 2-13 ROF: 3 MTR	Flak 88 MA: 20L(6) ROF: 3 M# 10 AA
4	3					2			

[ELR: 3]
{SAN: 5}


Set up in the OP Bunker in hex OO13:

4-4-7	8-0	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1 LMG
2		

Elements of the 1st Battalion, 914th Infantry Regiment enter on turn one along the south edge and/or the east edge on/south-of hexrow W:

4-6-7	9-2	8-1	8-0	FP: 7 Rng: 16 ROF: 3 HMG	FP: 5 Rng: 12 ROF: 2 MMG	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1 LMG	MA: 50° Rng: 2-13 ROF: 3 MTR	12-4 PSK
16	2				2	4	2	

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexrows N-TT are in play.)

HANDICAPS:

- Add two MMGs to the American units setting up ≤ 4 hexes from T10.
- The Germans receive one module of 75mm OBA (HE & S) directed from the OP Bunker.
- Any mutually agreed upon alteration to either side's OB.

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Moderate, with no wind at start.
- The Americans may ignore broken German units for rout purposes.
- The Americans receive one module of 120mm NOBA directed by a SFCP.
- The OPB has an inherent AXMG with a CA of NN12-NN13. No other AXMGs are in play.

POINTE DU HOC, FRANCE, 6 June 1944: The Germans responded swiftly to the Ranger attack. Their first counter-attack was launched from the west, from the direction of St. Pierre-du-Mont. Despite dwindling ammunition, the enemy attack was halted. Isolated German units continued to harass the Rangers, usually popping out of hidden tunnel openings or by moving along trenches unobserved. A handful of enemy soldiers held out in the German observation bunker at cliff's edge until a few well placed satchel charges induced eight survivors to surrender. At 1600 a second, and stronger counter-attack came in on the Ranger positions, threatening to isolate the defender's outpost positions. Sergeant Elder and his mortar man fired over seventy-five rounds, firing without pause. Combined with a hail of lead from accurate BAR sniping, the enemy attack was halted. Despite the momentary success, casualties, including a wounded Lieutenant Colonel Rudder, began to rise alarmingly. Ammunition was running low. The Rangers could only dig their holes a little deeper and await nightfall.



THE LONGEST NIGHT

PdH #4

◆ AMERICAN Sets Up First	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
⚔ GERMAN Moves First										

RANGERS Elements of Companies D, E, and F, 2nd Ranger Battalion set up on/north-of hexrow L:

7-6-7	9-1	8-0	FP: 5 Rng: 12 ROF: 2	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1
[ELR: 4]	7		2	
[SAN: 2]				

+ Elements of 1st Battalion, 914th Infantry Regiment enter along the south and/or west edge(s) on/between hexes A8 and H0 on the turn indicated:

Turn 1:

4-6-7	8-0	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1
4		

Turn 3:

1 4-6-7	8-1	7-0	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1	dm MTR 50 mm
6					

Turn 5:

1 5-4-7 1	2-2-8	9-1	8-0	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1	FP: 3 Rng: 8 ROF: 1	dm MTR 81mm
6				2		

HANDICAPS:

- ⚔ The German turn three reinforcements arrive on turn two.
- ◆ Add two BAR gunners and one HS to the American OB.
- 👤 Any mutually agreed upon alteration to either side's OB.

BOARD LAYOUT:



(Only hexes numbered ≤ 13 in/south-of hexrow BB are in play.)

OBJECTIVES: The Germans win if at game end they have amassed ≥ 12 VP more than the Americans. In addition to normal CVP, the Germans gain VP for each Good Order unit north of the paved road.

SPECIAL RULES:

- EC are Clear, with a Mild Breeze blowing to the southeast at start.
- Night rules (E1.) are in effect. The Initial Base NVR is two hexes with Overcast and no Moon. The German is the Scenario ATTACKER and the American is the Scenario DEFENDER (E1.2). The Majority Squad Type of the Germans is Normal; that of the Americans is Stealthy.
- Ammunition Shortage (A19.131) is in effect for the Americans.
- The Americans may use HIP for one MMC (and any SMC/SW stacked with it) setting up anywhere northeast of the road running from A8 to H0.
- At the beginning of each PFPh, the phasing player makes a dr. If the dr is less than or equal to the current turn number, place a Blaze counter in hex H4 and make a Random Direction DR [EXC: the direction dr is halved (FRD)] to determine the final placement hex. Each unit that is in the same hex as the Blaze counter must immediately take a NMC, all other units within three hexes of the Blaze counter must immediately take a IPTC [EXC: units that are immune to pinning]. The Blaze counter will cause illumination as per E1.94. The Blaze counter has NO other effects. The Blaze counter is removed at the end of the player turn. The Blaze counter can only occur once per game.
- American units that fire a captured German MG are subject to the automatic sniper attack dr as per E1.76.

POINTE DU HOC, FRANCE, 6 June 1944: With over one-third of his 200+ strong force wounded, dead, or missing, the Rangers' hope of a quick relief faded as twilight approached. At an improvised CP located on top of a pile of rubble from the fallen cliff, Colonel Trevor, the British Commando liaison officer pessimistically announced, "Never have I been so convinced of anything as that I will be either a prisoner of war or casualty by daybreak." Around 2330, the moonlit night was pierced by shouts and the sound of whistles, heralding another enemy attack. A probing attack came in first, then another of undetermined strength at 0100. The strongest effort was launched by the Germans at 0300. Several confused actions were fought by tired and wounded Rangers. Due in no small part to the expert sharpshooting of BAR gunners William "L-Rod" Petty and Sergeant Robey, the Rangers held on. Many were lost during the D-Day night attack and presumed to be dead or captured. The only "reinforcements" to reach the men of the 2nd Ranger Battalion consisted of some lost paratroopers that straggled in. The outlook for survival looked bleak.



